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 Much scholarship is dedicated to Melville’s religious themes, and other scholarship 
carefully analyzes the innovative formal techniques used by Melville, such as biblical allusion, 
digressive essays, and philosophical musings imbedded in fiction. However, religious analysis 
often turns to biographical interpretations of Melville’s own beliefs, and formal analysis tends to 
highlight Melville’s idiosyncrasies rather than determine their function. This thesis uses the 
Bakhtinian concepts of dialogism and polyphony to show that Melville’s poetic techniques create 
open texts, allowing readers to freely engage with multiple religious views that are equally valid, 
though not equally beneficial. Anticipating the methodologies of agnosticism and pragmatism, 
Moby-Dick exemplifies an attitude of cheerful agnosticism, whereas Melville’s final major work, 
Clarel, exemplifies the frustrations of uncertainty. A primarily formal analysis allows scholars to 
view Melville both conforming and breaking out of expected religious attitudes in the 
nineteenth-century, without considering Melville a prophet of twentieth-century literary 
attitudes.   










 For my wife and cat.  
 
 For all the Sub-Sub-Librarians who, for some reason, find it worthwhile to study 
literature. “For by how much the more pains ye take to please the world, by so much the more 
shall ye for ever go thankless!” and yet, you dear Sub-Subs, you nonetheless “are clearing out the 
seven-storied heavens, and making refugees of long-pampered Gabriel, Michael, and Raphael, 
against your coming.”   










 Throughout this process I’ve learned that scholarship is always social and collaborative 
no matter how isolated it seems. Many members of the UTC English faculty throughout the past 
year and a half helped form this thesis. Special thanks to my advisor, Dr. Hannah Wakefield, 
whose continual dedication, excellent feedback, and encouragement, allowed this thesis to, 
hopefully, be worth reading. I’d also like to thank my other readers, Dr. Matthew Guy and Dr. 
Heather Palmer, whose unique perspectives on rhetoric, literature, and theory are greatly 
appreciated. Regarding practical matters, this thesis would not exist without the continual help 
and support of Dr. Rik Hunter. 
 I’d also like to thank past teachers and friends who’ve cultivated my interest in both 
literature, critical theory, and religion. For encouraging me to pursue Melville, I’d like to thank 
Dr. Cliff Foreman. For their continual support in conversations about literature, theory, and 
Spinoza’s Ethics, I’d like to thank Dr. James Arnett.  
  







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... iii 
 




TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... vi 
 




1. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
 
   The Basic History and Context of Melville’s Writings ....................................................5 
 
   Agnosticism and Pragmatism ...........................................................................................7 
 
2. HERE GOES FOR A COOL, COLLECTIVE DIVE AT DEATH” AGNOSTICISM 
AND PRAGMATISM IN MOBY-DICK ...........................................................................17 
 
   The Formal Function of Ishmael’s Humor .....................................................................20 
 
   Renaissance Skepticism ..................................................................................................24 
 
   The Function of Dramaturgy ..........................................................................................29 
 
   Ironic Springs of Wisdom: Homoeroticism and Mock-Spirituality ...............................34 
 
3. “THEOLOGY, ART THOU SO BLIND?” THE AGONY OF AGONOSTICISM IN 
CLAREL .............................................................................................................................42 
 
   The Scholarly Conversations of Clarel...........................................................................43 
 
   Frustrating Form and Its Intent .......................................................................................46 
 
   Contrasting Loomings: Ishmael and Clarel ....................................................................48 
 
   
vii 
   Aporetic Dialogue ...........................................................................................................52 
 
   The Prodigal ....................................................................................................................58 
 
   Heroes, or Lack Thereof .................................................................................................62 
 
   Clarel’s End and Clarel’s End ........................................................................................66 
 














“I think also that I have the Spirit of God.” 
 Saint Paul, 1 Corinthians 7:40 
 
“I too am uncertain.” 
 -Herman Melville, Marginal Annotation to 1 Corinthians 7:40 
 












 Across the span of his career, Herman Melville moved from popular novelist, to failed 
novelist, to moderately successful novelist, again to failed novelist, and finally to failed poet. The 
range of Melville’s success parallels the wide-ranging moods of his works, from his successful 
first novel, Typee (1846), with its buoyant travelogue style, to his droning, tortured, 18,000 line 
final major work, Clarel (1876). One of the most apparent fluctuations during his career is 
religion. The ebb and flow between faith and doubt is captured by Nathaniel Hawthorne, who 
wrote that Melville “can neither believe, nor be comfortable in his unbelief; and he is too honest 
and courageous not to try to do one or the other” (Journals 628). Melville’s writing continually 
engages with religious questions that neither settle for orthodox certainty or heterodox 
abandonment—in other words, agnosticism. 
 This thesis investigates how Melville portrays agnostic thought through the poetic 
techniques of two major works. Using primarily formal analysis, this work demonstrates that 
Melville moved from a more optimistic portrayal of agnosticism exemplified in Moby-Dick, to a 
more troubling pessimistic agnosticism reflected in Clarel. Mikhail Bakhtin’s concepts of 
polyphony and dialogism are particularly helpful for understanding Melville’s portrayals of 
agnosticism. Bakhtin’s formal theories are textually grounded, but also aptly describe the shifts 
in nineteenth-century society (the rise of industrialization, the newspaper democratizing 
knowledge, and dramatic political shifts) that allowed writings which allow open-ended poetics, 
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which are not didactic apologetics for particular worldviews. Melville’s works instead ask 
readers to contemplate their own beliefs in conjunction with Melville’s many characters.  
 Analyzing Melville’s formal approach to prose and poetry demonstrates that scholars of 
American literature and religion can successfully move beyond historical or sociological 
readings applied to literary texts and instead gain insights of historical, sociological, and 
religious attitudes from literary texts. Abram C. Van Engen, a scholar working in American 
literature and religion, writing in 2017, argues that the field of American Literature and Religion 
tends to “front load history and explain broad religious contexts before turning to more and more 
close readings” and calls for reevaluating the relationship between religion and literature “not as 
causal (from religion to literature) … but as mutually constitutive” (“Three Questions” 217-18). 
Engen admits that he too operates from a causal framework with historical schemas, saying 
“[t]his seems to be the way of things” (217). He isn’t sure if turning to close formal readings is 
the correct shift to make, but rather offers it as a possible starting point. My thesis partially 
answers that call to begin with formalism, but makes the alternative, or additional claim, that 
literature not only reflects historical moods, but after a close, critical read, can break out of the 
arbitrary confinements that history places on individual’s emotions and attitudes towards 
religion. The binary between our historical-religious schemas reading literature and our analysis 
of literature writing histories, must be equally utilized. 
 Herman Melville’s works are an excellent case-study in this idea of literature breaking 
out of the confinements of history. The strangeness, beauty, and ambiguity of Melville’s works 
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often lead them to be labeled “proto-modern”1 or “proto-postmodern”2 by scholars interested in 
genre and aesthetics, while historical readings attempt to explain their idiosyncrasies by putting 
forth historical events or movements that perhaps spawned the attitudes presented in a text. 
Between these two extremes, we find that they are both true, and few would deny this in theory, 
but the existing scholarship lacks this equality between theory, history, and the text. That 
Melville reacted to historical events is true without a doubt. In fact, using historical data, such as 
what literature influenced Melville or collecting biographical details of his family’s religious 
views, help explain certain recurring ideas and themes in his works. However, since Melville’s 
ideas, represented through his characters, do not easily fall into schemas of religious history in 
the nineteenth century, scholars instead need to use language that is not typical of the era to 
accurately describe Melville’s texts for modern audiences. It’s extremely difficult, for instance, 
to historically place Clarel, an 18,000 line poem about faith and doubt that doesn’t advocate for 
either faith or doubt, into the scholarly conversation of American Literature and Religion. Why 
read or write about an absurdly long and consistently depressing poem if it doesn’t contribute to 
either side of a nineteenth-century historical debate? For a post-modern writer, to leave a central 
thematic question open-ended is not surprising. But how could Melville, writing in the 
nineteenth-century, not answer the question he sets out to answer, leaving it uncomfortably 
open? As I will show, Melville scholars still suggest there are concrete arguments for belief, 
albeit hidden underneath the surface of what the text says for itself. These readings, however, are 
 
1 Tim Armstrong: “Melville is a consistently experimental writer, offering a restless expansion of the 
possibilities of genre in the novel” (Modernism: A Cultural History 23). 
 
 
2 Ihab Hassan: Moby-Dick is “written in mockery of system[s], written against any effort to harmonize 
discordant elements, against any mythic or metaphoric scheme” (“POSTmodernISM” 15). 
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clouded by moving from “the top down,” that is to say, they begin with a historical, religious, or 
philosophical schema, and from there, point out how Melville fits based on the text.  
 The binary between historical and close text-based readings is not solvable. So long as 
we think of novels and poems as historical objects, which they are, then including historical 
context feels obligatory. Context strengthens rhetorical arguments, helping them stay grounded 
in reality rather than theory (an arbitrary binary we can’t quite let go of either). That said, the job 
of the literary scholar is not to write history. That so many books on specific periods of 
American Literature and Religion inevitably end up spending more time explaining history and 
historiography rather than analyzing texts themselves attests to the primacy of history over 
textual analysis.3 This privilege, or hierarchy, of establishing the religious-historical context 
before performing formal readings, prevents texts from teaching us about the historical moment 
in which they were written from the point of view of an individual artist, not a philosopher, 
theologian or historian. Similarly, privileging historical context creates a sense of obligation to 
fit an artist’s non-conforming ideas into an established historical schema created by the critic.   
 In response, this thesis blends two modes of interpretation: historical and formal analysis. 
However, history is not presented as a detailed schema. It is utilized only to enhance an 
understanding of formal techniques that set Melville apart from his contemporaries, for instance, 
 
3 Books that give general overviews of American literature and religion, not focusing on a single text, but 
common threads between texts, is specifically what I’m referring to. Two examples of what I am 
responding to: Tracy Fessenden’s Culture and Redemption (2007), which traces American literature and 
religion from Puritan writings to Fitzgerald. She sees “hegemonic power of appeals to a Protestant 
consensus in American public life” (213) as the primary historical basis of American literature and 
religion. American literature responding to or against this Protestant majority. Dawn Coleman’s 
Preaching and the Rise of the American Novel offers a similar interpretation. Coleman establishes 
historically, in the first two chapters, the importance of preaching in American culture. Coleman argues 
that any subversive literature dealing with American religion tried “resisting preaching through mockery, 
irony, and satire” but “they also envied it, identified with it, and appropriated it as a distinctive and 
authoritative mode of addressing audiences” (4). Their section on Melville is briefly dealt with later.  
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his wide-ranging literary influences.4 Likewise, formalism is not used to make Melville a prophet 
of later ideas, but rather reinforce his unique representations of religious thought that disrupt our 
notions of what nineteenth-century American literature, and by extension American literature in 
general, can say about religion at any given period. If scholars lessen the pressure to present 
entire historical systems before analysis, then perhaps the texts themselves will enlighten how 
individuals experienced and dealt with religious ideas in unique ways. 
 
 
The Basic History and Context of Melville’s Writings 
Taking what scholars have written about Melville’s life and influences, we can find 
helpful explanations for how Moby-Dick and Clarel function in response to their environment. In 
addition, however, we should also see how they break out of literary expectations. A brief 
overview of Melville’s career and the major contexts of his writings shows Melville’s both 
conformity and experimentalism. There is no schema to the brief historical sketch presented, 
only general facts left uninterpreted as much as possible.  
 Melville’s first wholly fictional work, Mardi (1849), wrestles with the changes in thought 
during the late 1840s. Seemingly a standard sea-faring story, it morphs into an allegory of both 
religious, philosophical, and political ideologies. Characters visit various islands that represent 
new philosophical and religious ideas rooted in skepticism, such as “the accuracy of perception, 
the foundations of selfhood, the scope of human reason, and the bases for moral judgment” (Lee 
 
4 This necessitates biographical knowledge of what books Melville read and annotated; it is unavoidably 
historical.  
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113). Melville’s desire to explore religious possibilities that may undermine traditional 
worldviews, is a continual theme throughout his career. 
 Although published only two years later, Moby-Dick (1851) takes the allusiveness and 
encyclopedic nature of Mardi into new formal territory. Through the narrator, Ishmael, Moby-
Dick explores issues of religious plurality and epistemology. Melville’s readings of Shakespeare, 
the Bible (Parker 504-506), and philosophical and politically minded books like Carlyle’s Sartor 
Resartus and Emerson’s Representative Men (Sealts 59, 67) pushed Melville into dealing with 
the same issues as Mardi in new forms. Melville’s celebrated short stories continue these 
philosophical themes, and two of his novels, Pierre (1852) and The Confidence-Man (1857) 
pushed these musings on philosophical, religious, and existential anxieties to extremes that led to 
Melville’s failed career as a novelist.  
 Between Melville’s final prose work, The Confidence-Man, which came out two years 
before Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), and Melville’s long-poem Clarel (1876), significant 
changes took place both historically and scholastically. Of course, the American Civil War 
altered the landscape of American identity, politics, and religion. But other intellectual changes 
between 1857 and 1876, such as the introduction of agnosticism through English thinkers like 
T.H. Huxley, the rise of American Unitarianism, and comparative religious scholars like James 
Freeman Clarke and Max Müller, altered understandings of truth, making religion more 
inclusive. Comparative religious scholars introduced eastern religions, like Buddhism and 
Hinduism, along with dead religions like Zoroastrianism and Gnosticism, into the public 
consciousness. In 1871, five years before Clarel’s publication, Clarke wrote: “Twenty-five years 
ago it was hardly possible to procure any adequate information concerning Brahmanism, 
Buddhism, [etc.] … But now…we have ample means of ascertaining the essential facts 
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concerning most of these movements” (4). The sudden burst of scholarship surrounding these 
religions allowed lay-people to access other cultures and religions, expanding the scope of 
religious possibilities; in response to this plurality, agnosticism became an attractive alternative 
to absolute belief and non-belief. 
 
 
Agnosticism and Pragmatism 
 Throughout this thesis, agnosticism is used in the same sense as its first proponent, T.H. 
Huxley. Huxley, in 1869, defined agnosticism through a declaration: “[i]n matters of the 
intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration.” 
Additionally, the methodological foundation of agnosticism is to “not pretend that conclusions 
are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable” (187). Huxley coined the word 
“agnosticism” in response to his frustration with atheist’s attempts to topple theism as 
irrationally as theist’s attempt to topple atheism.5 Instead of trying to overtake belief with non-
belief or vice versa, Huxley argues that agnosticism stays out of the dichotomy because it is not a 
belief “but a method… it is as old as Socrates; as old as the writer who said, 'Try all things, hold 
fast by that which is good’” (187). Focusing on epistemological humility, Huxley encourages 
individuals to “not be ashamed to look the universe in the face, whatever the future may have in 
store for him” (187). Huxley’s agnosticism gives religious belief the possibility of truth. While 
Huxley is the figure most associated with agnosticism in the nineteenth-century, the ideas of 
agnosticism were not isolated in England. The German-born nineteenth-century comparative 
 
5 Within the philosophical conversation, “Huxley’s creation of the new term agnosticism was also 
intended to signify that his position was to be distinguished from empiricism” (Lightman 27). 
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religious scholar Max Müller describes himself as agnostic depending on its definition. He 
writes, “I am, and always have been, an Agnostic, that is, in relying on nothing but historical 
facts and in following reason as far as it will take us… and in never pretending that conclusions 
are certain which are not demonstrated” (355). On the other hand, if agnosticism “excludes a 
recognition of an eternal reason pervading the natural and moral world… then I am a Gnostic 
[not agnostic]” (356). Agnosticism is not a philosophy, but rather, like the scientific method, a 
methodology towards truth.  
 While not a synonym for agnosticism, American pragmatism also sees itself as first and 
foremost a methodology, not a new school of thought. James, like Huxley, suggests that 
pragmatism is “a new name for some old ways of thinking,” to quote the subtitle of James’ work 
Pragmatism (1907). Like agnosticism, James defines pragmatism not as a philosophical system, 
but as “a method only,” intended to open the “possibilities of nature… against dogma, 
artificiality, and the presence of finality in truth” (Pragmatism 71). Pragmatism begins with 
presenting a new definition of truth that evades rationalism and irrationalism equally. 
 James responds to the perennial question, “What is truth?” with the following answer: 
“True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify” (Pragmatism 141). 
Although seemingly an empiricist approach, James includes this caveat: an individual must ask, 
“what concrete difference will [any belief] being true make in any one’s actual life? How will the 
truth be realized?” (141). James’ entire work Pragmatism is a defense against the charge that 
pragmatism is merely wishful thinking or relativism, and other works like his essay “The Will to 
Believe,” attempt to show how this methodology can apply to truths both scientific and religious. 
 Religious belief and its connection to human psychology fascinated James. His essay 
“The Will to Believe” is, he argues, “an essay in justification of faith, a defense of our right to 
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adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect 
may not have been coerced” (1-2). James argues that each individual, because of upbringing, 
culture, and personal inclinations, possesses live and dead beliefs, like live or dead wires. If for 
instance you ask a white American from the South to “‘be a Mohammedan,’ it is probably a dead 
option” because the possibility of suddenly adopting a foreign and unknown belief is unlikely.6 
From this, James argues that if religious beliefs are helpful for allowing an individual to cope 
with existence, and they provide an inspiration for good morals, then faith is worth adopting. He 
summarizes his argument through a quotation of Fitz James Stephen: “‘We do not certainly 
know whether there is any right one [truth]. What must we do? Be strong and of a good courage. 
Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes’” (31). James, charitable to religious 
faith, makes it clear that he “cannot see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, 
or willfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the game” (28). James’ interest in unseen 
human drives counters Huxley, a biologist, in their respective attitudes towards the value of 
truths not demonstrable by evidence.  
 Although writing before the coining of “agnosticism” and “pragmatism,” Melville 
anticipates both methodologies. This doesn’t make Melville a prophet of Huxley or James, but 
rather reinforces the fact that agnosticism and pragmatism, as both Huxley and James remind 
their readers, are found throughout the history of theology, philosophy, and literature. 
Understanding Melville’s formal techniques and influences reinforce why describing Melville’s 
writings as agnostic or pragmatic is not anachronistic. Instead, these familiar words more simply 
describe the recurring philosophical and theological attitudes that Melville revamps in the 1850s. 
 
6 There are many nuances to James’ argument, and his book-length study The Varieties of Religious 
Experience investigates these same themes in far more detail. 
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 By using the words “agnostic” and “pragmatic” to describe the methodologies of 
characters seeking religious truth in Melville’s works, not Melville himself, the function of the 
art becomes clearer. Melville’s art presents multiple characters, ideas, philosophies, and truths 
with equal credence. We’ll see how the epistemological focus of Moby-Dick and Clarel is not 
which beliefs are "truer than others,” but rather which beliefs are more beneficial. How 
Melville’s writings achieve this democratic representation of multiple truths is explored through 
analyzing the dialogic poetics in Moby-Dick and Clarel.  
 Within the realm of American literature and religious scholarship, agnosticism is not 
widely discussed. This makes sense on the surface: agnosticism is not a religion. The 
methodology of O’Leary’s Thick and Dazzling Darkness (2017) explains this schema. O’Leary’s 
book, in his words, “addresses and discusses the ways poets verbalize thoughts and feelings on 
the nature of the divine, typically in symbolically rich language” (20). Although this sounds 
inclusive of, say, non-organized religious views on religion, he clarifies that the poetry he 
analyzes is exclusively religious. He writes, “I follow Jonathan Z. Smith’s definition that religion 
is ‘a system of beliefs and practices that are relative to superhuman beings.’… It’s commonplace 
nowadays… to trade [the word ‘religion’] for the word, ‘spirituality.’ Spiritual implies personal 
beliefs where religious signifies institutional, doctrinal adherence. Throughout this study, I am 
referring to religion and not to spirituality” (25). This schema creates some arbitrary decisions 
about what constitutes as religious poetry. Whitman’s transcendentalism is associated with 
Unitarianism (38) and he calls Eliot’s The Wasteland, written before his conversion to 
Christianity, “one of the great apocalyptic poems in Christian Literature” (39). Because 
agnosticism is not a traditional religious group, but a religious attitude, scholars in American 
literature and religious scholarship hesitate to discuss it. This explains why, in Melville 
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scholarship, Melville’s portrayals of religious thought are more associated with Unitarianism; 
even though Unitarianism is a more inclusive religious group than, say, Calvinist Protestantism, 
it is still organized. However, formally, Melville’s works explore what is more accurately 
described as agnosticism, as this thesis shows. And while not an organized group, agnosticism is 
still a religious attitude and deserves scholarly attention.  
 Scholars who overuse Melville’s biography connect Melville’s joyful uncertainty with a 
non-religious spirituality (never referred to as agnostic), while Melville’s despairing uncertainty 
is associated with the surrender of intellectual pursuits (sometimes described as agnostic, in the 
sense of giving up hope for knowledge). This stems, primarily, from an inability to allow the 
characters of Melville’s fiction to speak for themselves; the illusion of Melville’s characters 
possessing their own consciousnesses separated from their author is one of Melville’s great 
stylistic contributions, yet scholars are hesitant to remove the artist from his characters. For 
instance, Yothers argues that Melville is "agnostic” when at his most despairing, both poetically 
and personally, struggling with alcoholism during the period of writing his final (completed) 
novel, The Confidence-Man (Sacred 125). But Yothers argues that Melville is “not a proto-
atheist or an early agnostic, or a Christian longing for the capacity for belief” but rather “all of 
those conflicting things and none” (Sacred 214) when we study all of his works. Agnosticism is 
denied to Melville even though Yothers’ phrase “Sacred Uncertainty” describes an agnostic 
methodology with an optimistic spiritual twist. Other authors follow this pattern: Bezanson uses 
biographical artifacts to argue Melville moves from agnostic intellectual-giving-up, towards 
“edur[ing] the overwhelming sense of a shattered vision” (“Historical” 612-13). Similarly, 
Joseph Knapp uses Hegelian philosophy to argue Melville’s ultimate theological conclusion is to 
endure life despite suffering (119-123), while Stan Goldman invokes existentialism to suggest 
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that Melville advocates forcing oneself into religious “belief [that] is not true—not 
corresponding with any fact” but nonetheless “help[s] one to strive for a more worthy life” (144). 
Using new-historicism, William Potter, comparing Melville to nineteenth-century comparative 
religious scholars, suggests that Melville found peace in the “intersympathy of creeds” by simply 
portraying religious difference in his works. Potter’s humanist interpretation is essentially 
agnostic in definition: "In this lack of resolution between contrary positions, Melville seems to 
be emphasizing... a heterodox state of acquired or attainted irresolution. The experience of the 
real world breeds religious doubt, but the believer must subject his faith to just this test to 
authenticate it” (111-112). What all these readings share, despite their outward differences, is an 
attempt to turn Melville into a religious or philosophical teacher. Contrary to this approach, I 
suggest that Melville himself does not try to teach the reader anything; instead, the characters of 
Melville’s fiction and poetry are dialogic representations of differing beliefs that readers must 
choose to accept or criticize. Melville can’t escape favoring certain views more than others, of 
course (truly “free” characters are impossible to create). Yet Melville continually places figures 
who are humble, earnest, and intellectually rigorous, like Ishmael, above those who either 
blindly believe without cause, like Starbuck, or adopt views that drive them towards monomania, 
like Ahab.  
 This thesis analyzes the joyful agnosticism in Moby-Dick and then analyzes the agonizing 
agnosticism of Clarel. The two works presented together, show that Melville is capable of 
presenting the same ideas with different attitudes. Moby-Dick is cheerful, despite its tragic 
ending, because it shows the possibility of a space wherein truths are held in equal regard until 
dogmatism drives them to their destruction. On the other hand, Clarel demonstrates that the 
utopian vision of complete ecumenical fraternity is impossible so long as the desire for absolute 
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certainty exists (which it always will). Both works nonetheless present an agnostic outlook as the 
gateway to intellectual humility that prevents monomaniacal dogmatism. Pragmatically, Moby-
Dick highlights the joys of agnosticism while Clarel highlights the loneliness imbedded in 
uncertainty. Through formal analysis we can glean how and why Melville portrays the same 
agnostic outlook from the perspectives of joy and resignation.  
 Throughout this work formalism refers to the practice of analyzing how texts work 
through their genre, poetic techniques, and language. Formalism is a general term for multiple 
schools of thought, mostly New Criticism and Russian Formalism. While New Critics focused 
on “the study of literature ‘as literature,’ rather than as language” (Barry 17) and the Russian 
Formalists focused on how literary language “has its own characteristic procedures and effects, 
and is not just a version of ordinary language” (Barry 164), both are primarily concerned with 
“close formal analysis of literature… the belief that the language of literature has its own 
characteristic procedures and effects” and that texts use poetic techniques, from linguistic 
wordplay to the structure of a plot, to demonstrate how literary works communicate ideas to the 
reader (Barry 164). Formalism is an attempt to exegete meaning out of the literal poetic or 
structural elements of a text rather than an eisegesis that approaches a text with a certain view in 
mind and finding how the text reflects that view. This thesis uses formalism when discussing 
how a given text presents itself to the reader, whether that be the layout of the plot in Moby-Dick, 
the poetic techniques used in Clarel (rhyme and meter, for instance), or how characters interact 
with one another to create dialogue. Russian formalism, because it focuses on the intermixing of 
spoken and literary language, provides a textually grounded theory for understanding Melville’s 
dialogic poetics. 
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 Melville uses dialogic poetics throughout Moby-Dick and Clarel to allow multiple voices 
to express conflicting truths. Dialogue and dialogism are key formal terms Bakhtin defines and 
describes. Dialogue is used as both literal dialogues between characters, and as manifestations of 
dialogism. Dialogism is a poetic technique wherein multiple “chronotopes,” or voices, exist in 
the same space. Bakhtin writes,  
Within the limits of a single work and within the total literary output of a single author 
we may notice a number of different chronotopes and complex interactions among them, 
specific to the given work or author; it is common moreover for one of these chronotopes 
to envelope or dominate the others. (Dialogic 252)  
Put simply, dialogic poetics are the literary representation of two or more voices, representing 
different ideologies, engaging with one another. In more complex situations, characters can 
dialogue with themselves, as will be seen in Moby-Dick, by holding two or more seemingly 
contradictory worldviews at once and engaging in self-reflection. When an author uses multiple 
languages or dialects at once, creating tension between literary language and spoken languages, 
this is also a form dialogism, specially called “heteroglossia.” Heteroglossia often challenges 
which languages or dialects are more “literary” or respected within a culture, criticizing the 
hierarchical nature of languages. 
 Melville allows multiple characters to exist, not as mouthpieces for himself, but as 
illusively individual consciousnesses. The lack of clear authority between right and wrong 
characters creates ambiguity. Readers naturally wonder what a novel or poem advocates, either 
morally or spiritually, but literature occasionally breaks out of moral obligation. Bakhtin calls 
this phenomenon of unresolved dialogue “polyphony.” Bakhtin describes polyphony as “A 
plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses” (Problems 6). While this 
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sounds almost synonymous with dialogue, Bakhtin describes true polyphony as a nineteenth-
century phenomenon that differs from the “early buds of polyphony” found in Rabelais, 
Cervantes, and Shakespeare (Problems 34). In those pre-nineteenth-century works, a monologic 
frame provided space for multiple voices to express themselves. For example, the dialogic works 
of Rabelais critique Renaissance France from a humanist point-of-view, and are therefore 
historically limited to Rabelais’ humanism. A villain in Rabelais is not a free consciousness, but 
rather serves the purpose as an antithesis to Rabelais’ humanism. In the nineteenth-century 
polyphonic novel, the text becomes open to the point wherein one cannot extract a higher 
meaning, or single moral. Villains are simply villains, not necessarily condemned or pitied by the 
judgement of the author. Bakhtin explains,  
in literature, as we have seen, the statement of an idea is usually thoroughly monologic. 
An idea is either confirmed or repudiated. All confirmed ideas are merged in the unity of 
the author's seeing and representing consciousness; the unconfirmed ideas are distributed 
among the heroes, no longer as signifying ideas, but rather as socially typical or 
individually characteristic manifestations of thought. The one who knows, understands, 
and sees is in the first instance the author himself. (Problems 82)  
Therefore, when I describe Melville’s poetics as agnostic, I do not insinuate that the poetics 
advocate for an agnostic worldview. On the contrary, by describing Melville’s poetics as 
agnostic, I mean that they are not didactic, but instead dialogical representations of multiple, 
sometimes combatting, truths.7 
 
7 While not discussed in this essay, it is not a coincidence that agnosticism coincides with modernization, 
consisting of the global market, industrialization, capitalism, and lower-middle-class access to novels, 
which, according to Bakhtin, are the historical bases of dialogism to polyphony (Dialogic 30-31). 
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 The first section of this thesis, centered on Moby-Dick, argues that Ishmael presents an 
epistemological methodology contrary to Ahab’s certainty of God’s nature. Analyzing Ishmael’s 
plurality of truths through dialogic poetics, along with his acceptance of unknowability, Ishmael 
optimistically offers hope in a world without certain religious truth. The second section centering 
on Clarel, on the other hand, morphs into a pessimistic view of the same agnostic-pragmatism 
Ishmael encourages. In a world full of so many voices, representing so many truths, the burden 
of choice creates confusion, despair, and agonizing agnosticism.  
  









“HERE GOES FOR A COOL, COLLECTIVE DIVE AT DEATH” 
 
AGNOSTICISM AND PRAGMATISM IN MOBY-DICK 
 
 
The first sentence of Moby-Dick is not “Call me Ishmael.” Iconic though that line is, the 
first sentence is the following: “The pale Usher—threadbare in coat, heart, body, and brain; I see 
him now” (6). Unlike the hearty Ishmael’s famous greeting, Melville starts the novel with a 
sketch centered on a sickly assistant schoolmaster who “loved to dust his old grammars” because 
it “somehow mildly reminded him of his own mortality” (6). The mood is dark and elusive but 
functions as the first instance of Melville’s dialogic poetics which formally carry the novel’s 
central themes forward.  
 Melville’s sketch calls to mind Hawthorne’s sketch “The Custom-House” which kicks off 
The Scarlet Letter. Like that sketch, the “Etymology” functions as a handing-off to the reader; 
getting their first taste of the novel from a second-hand, not the narrator Ishmael. What follows 
are three etymologies of the word “Whale.” Richard Hackluyt, famed sixteenth-century explorer, 
insists that the “h” in “Whale” ought to be emphasized in English pronunciation. But who in the 
English-speaking world still pronounces “Whale” as “Wah-Hale?” Then we are given two 
dictionary etymologies: Webster’s dictionary suggests that “Whale” is “named from roundness 
or rolling; for in Dan. hvalt is arched or vaulted” while Richardson’s dictionary suggests 
conversely that “It is more immediately from the Dut. And Ger. Wallen; A.S. Walw-ian, to roll, 
to wallow.” The central epistemological problem of the novel is already on display. Are 
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Richardson and Webster equally correct? Or is one privileged over the other? There is no textual 
indication in the sketch. Instead, the reader is left without certainty. The dictionary definitions 
are thus in dialogue with one another, and neither is given pre-eminence. 
 Melville explores the arbitrary binary between over-certain monomaniacs and care-free 
desperados, later described in 1906 by American philosopher William James in his work 
Pragmatism. James writes that there are generally two types of people: the “tender-minded” and 
the “tough-minded.” The tender-minded are defined as “usually…more religious” and “in favor 
of what is called free will” (50). They are also “Idealistic” or “Optimistic” (50). Those who 
ascribe the nature of the universe to a monistic force of some kind, whether that be Hegel’s 
Absolute or a pantheistic god (55), are often indifferent to experience and facts surrounding them 
concerning the suffering of the world. The other type of figure which appears in Moby-Dick is 
the “tough-minded,” described by James. These individuals are “Pessimistic” “Irreligious” and 
“Fatalistic” (50). Ishmael describes characters like this, most exemplified by Ahab, the 
monomaniacal captain of the Pequod who spurs the crew into a hunt for the white whale. James 
states that these two groups are not fixed. People ebb and flow between them and adopt certain 
parts of each. James’ pragmatism attempts to break down this binary by satisfying both 
personalities: “our esteem for facts has not neutralized in us all religiousness… [The Individual] 
wants facts; he wants science; but he also wants a religion” (50). Moby-Dick likewise portrays 
this desire to attain religious truth while escaping dogmatism, scientific or religious. 
 Ishmael’s methodology of truth-seeking predates William James’ description of 
pragmatism: “I offer… pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of demand. It can 
remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve 
the richest intimacy with facts” (62). Although predating James, the methodology of Ishmael 
   
19 
reflects the same basic desire to find metaphysical truths while also staying grounded in 
scientific truths. That said, Ishmael’s voice, unique as it is, does not prophesy the advent of 
pragmatism. In response to the faith-doubt crisis, Melville, like James, seeks a middle-way. 
Ishmael breaks free of the aforementioned binary of reason and religion through his literary 
influences, like biblical language, Shakespearean dramaturgy, and essays, along with the 
rhetorical ethos of skeptics who blend humor and sincerity in their theological of philosophical 
writings.  
 While the aforementioned etymological sketch might suggest the novel is primarily 
melancholic, most of the book is notably humorous. One wonders if D.H. Lawrence, one of 
Moby-Dick’s first champions, only read the last five pages of the novel when he exclaims that 
the center of the novel is “Doom! Doom! Doom! Something seems to whisper it in the very dark 
trees of America. Doom! Doom of what? Doom of our white day. We are doomed, doomed. And 
the doom is in America” (146). While capturing the themes of colonization and cultural 
destruction, Lawrence neglects that much of the novel contains jocular essays and humorous, yet 
earnest, celebrations of cultural difference. Hilton Obenzinger writes that, “extending through all 
of the digressions… [a]ny serious or somber meditation is qualified or questioned or undermined 
by humor” (“Wicked Books” 187). The coexistence of comedic writing beside meditations on 
epistemology is partially indebted to Ishmael’s poetic heteroglossia. Ishmael, utilizing humor, 
skepticism, and the genre of Renaissance essays, presents a cheerful display of the benefits of 
agnosticism amidst an increasingly scientific, secular, and global world. 
  




The Formal Function of Ishmael’s Humor 
Ishmael presents himself as a neurotic and well-read individual, yet he is surrounded by 
sailors drastically different from himself, culturally and linguistically. The highlight of 
differences in language is one of Bakhtin’s arguments for how novels rebel against the hierarchy 
of “epic” works by portraying the working class on the same level as the aristocratic classes. 
Bakhtin writes that in aristocratic literature, “making fun of the linguistic and speech manners of 
groups living in different districts and cities throughout the nation, is something that belongs to 
every people's most ancient [literature]” (Dialogic 82). However, with the advent of the modern 
novel, read by lower classes and women, the process is reversed. After Rabelais, the “parodying 
images of dialects began to receive more profound artistic formulation, and began to penetrate 
major literature” (82). Ishmael uses linguistic parody to make fun of himself, while humanizing 
those who do not share his “literariness.” 
 An early dialogue between Ishmael and the inn-keeper, Peter Coffin, humorously 
highlights the function of dialogic poetics. Ishmael, afraid of sleeping in the same bed as “a 
madman,” later revealed to be the south-sea islander Queequeg, confronts the landlord with a 
long defense against sleeping with a harpooner. He ends his speech to Peter Coffin dramatically: 
“and you, sir, you I mean, landlord, you, sir, by trying to induce me to do so knowingly, would 
thereby render yourself liable to a criminal prosecution” (29). His repetitious, neurotic, and 
judicial language contrasts with Peter Coffin’s wearisome reply “‘Wall…. That’s a purty long 
sarmon for a chap that rips a little now and then…’” and he defends the harpooner Queequeq by 
simply saying “He pays reg’lar” (29). Queequeg peddling heads and worshipping an idol are new 
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and frightening experiences for Ishmael. The confrontation between status-quo and foreign 
dialects and cultures force Ishmael to make a choice: either learn to love those who lack the 
social refinement and education he possesses or give-up his desire to sail. These early sections of 
the novel function as a humorous bildungsroman, showing Ishmael’s shift from close-minded 
fear of the other, towards embracing cultural difference. The opening also functions as an 
explanation for Ishmael’s ecumenical humanism; as the novel progresses, Ishmael becomes less 
of a character, and simply narrates with a voice of charity. 
 The dialogic difference between cultures and languages produces both intellectual growth 
and religious tolerance in Ishmael. Initially afraid of Queequeq, Ishmael learns to love him 
through internal dialogic reasoning. Ishmael, who sardonically describes himself as “born and 
bred in the bosom of the infallible Presbyterian church” (52), defends the idolatrous worship of 
Queequeg’s idol Yojo through Christ’s commandment “to do to my fellow man what I would 
have my fellow man do to me—that is the will of God” (53). And then, after helping Queequeg 
worship, “in our hearts’ honey-moon, lay I and Queequeg—a cosy, loving pair” (53). Despite 
linguistic and cultural gaps between Ishmael and Queequeg, Ishmael is able to grow closer to this 
“cannibal” through ironic blaspheming against religious orthodoxy. Ishmael plays with a biblical 
text, making the greatest commandment an ironic, but nonetheless pragmatic, defense of loving 
others. 
 Ishmael presents himself as changing from a land-faring intellectual into a sea-faring 
adventurer. This change is reflected, textually, by genre shifts. Before boarding the Pequod, the 
genre is primarily an adventure narrative, much like Melville’s previous four books. However, 
once on board the Pequod, the genres expand. Unlike Mardi’s attempt to subtly move from an 
adventure novel to an allegorical tale, Moby-Dick changes of genre call attention to themselves. I 
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refer to many of Ishmael’s chapters as “essays” because they most clearly, as will be shown, 
echo the non-fiction English writings Melville knew. Ishmael’s essays, like the erudite 
polymaths he invokes, often shifts the style of the essays. Some are more investigative, while 
others are scientific. Almost all, however, subvert or add humor to otherwise serious genres of 
writing, such as the scientific treatise (“Cetology”) or empirical philosophy (“The Fountain”). 
 Ishmael uses biblical texts specifically subverts orthodoxy throughout Moby-Dick.8 This 
technique allows dialogic poetics to present, without overt blasphemy, literal interpretations of 
the Bible. Melville, attracted to the biblical wisdom books of  Job, Psalms, Proverbs, 
Ecclesiastes, and Song of Solomon, makes use of their themes and poetic forms. Like the 
exploitation of the golden rule to worship an idol noted above, Ishmael revels in jokes derived 
from literal readings of the Bible to create ironic critiques of religious presuppositions. A fan of 
oxymoronic descriptions, Ishmael compares ships joyfully chasing whales unto their violent 
deaths to “pious Solomon devoutly worshipping among his thousand concubines” (293). 
Jocularly highlighting that Solomon’s archetypal wisdom is undermined by his sexual excesses 
(1 Kings 11), Ishmael uses these literal biblical images to create humorous unease among those 
with complacent or assumed theological beliefs.  
 The relationship between the Bible and Moby-Dick is well noted in scholarship. For 
instance, Stephen J. Bennett’s article “A Wisdom That is Woe” focuses on the influence of 
Ecclesiastes on Moby-Dick. Stylistically, both Ecclesiastes and Moby-Dick have baffled critics 
because of their inability to be “correctly” interpreted. Both books are “hidden mysteries that 
remain unsolved” (Bennett 57). Bennet notes Ishmael’s insistence that true joys are found in 
simple pleasures, derived from the later analyzed chapter “A Squeeze of the Hand,” echoes 
 
8 For a brief but informative overview of Melville’s (often humorous) annotations of the Bible, see Brian 
Yothers’ Sacred Uncertainty pages 21-47. 
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Ecclesiastes’ preaching to “Live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest all the days of the life 
of thy vanity, which he hath given thee under the sun” (KJV, Eccl. 9:9). Scholars like Bennett, 
therefore, attempt to demonstrate biblical precedents for Ishmael’s unorthodox ideas.  
 In addition to these helpful readings of biblical themes in Moby-Dick, I add that 
Ishmael’s technique of using biblical images and language for the purposes of critique belongs to 
a long history of carnivalized biblical literature.9 The conscious influence of Rabelais and 
Thomas Browne on Ishmael’s essayistic voice makes it clear that the function of Ishmael’s 
parody is more in line with medieval and renaissance parody;10 historically, Bakhtin 
demonstrates that “the role of parody was extremely important: it paved the way for a new 
literary and linguistic consciousness [i.e. the novel]” (Dialogic 71). Bakhtin further describes 
medieval and renaissance parody as “ritual degrading and the ridiculing of higher powers,” 
whereas the “functions of parody [in the nineteenth-century] are narrow and unproductive” 
means to simply make fun of others (71). Authors of biblical parody, including the astonishingly 
bawdy Rabelais, identified as Christians, and offered critiques rather than complete dismissals of 
religion. Similarly, Ishmael uses his status as “a good Christian; born and bred in the bosom of 
the infallible Presbyterian Church” to parody religion with the purpose of improving it.  
  
 
9 Bakhtin argues biblical parody, first seen in the early middle ages, is one of the first emanations of 
dialogic poetics. In works such as Cyprian Feast (composed around 400 AD) which consists of biblical 
quotations and images, “all the personages of sacred history from Adam and Eve to Christ and his 
Apostles eat, drink and make merry. In this work a correspondence of all details to Sacred Writ is strictly 
and precisely observed, but at the same time the entire Sacred Writ is transformed into carnival, or more 
correctly into Saturnalia” (Dialogic 70). 
 
 
10 Sealts chronicle shows that before writing Moby-Dick, Melville read the essays of Montaigne (199), 
Rabelais novels (207), and Browne s Religio Medici (159). Melville reverentially referred to Browne as a 
kind of crack d Archangel” (39). 





Prior to writing Moby-Dick, Melville read Religio Medici by Thomas Browne. Browne, a 
seventeenth-century essayist whose interests spanned religious discourse, hermetic philosophy, 
and alchemy, influenced Melville’s prose-style and Ishmael’s voice (Parker 505). Ishmael, along 
with other renaissance skeptics such as Montaigne, emulates Browne’s style. While they share 
many stylistic and rhetorical strategies, Ishmael carefully infuses personal experience and 
narrative into theory, whereas Browne sticks to intellectual discussions.  
 There is a sense of intellectual adventurousness in Ishmael’s narration, making the 
Pequod an excellent space to explore new, potentially dangerous, ideas. “I love to sail forbidden 
seas,” Ishmael says in the opening chapter, “Not ignoring what is good, I am quick to perceive a 
horror, and could still be social with it” (20). This follows Browne’s adventurous intellectualism: 
“I am, I confesse, naturally inclined to that, which misguided zeale termes superstition,” 
claiming that “my behaviour full of rigor, sometimes not without morosity… yet at my devotion 
I love to use… all those outward and sensible motions, which may expresse, or promote my 
invisible devotion” (63). Ishmael acknowledges his lack of scholastic knowledge, “What am I 
that I should essay to hook the nose of this leviathan?” He tries regardless: “I am in earnest; and I 
will try” (110). Browne’s approach is similar: “In Philosophy where truth seems double-faced, 
there is no man more paradoxical than my selfe” (66). Both Ishmael and Browne, without certain 
knowledge about a subject, use ancient authorities, reason and intuition to seek truth.  
 However, the ultimate measure of truth, though similar, differs between Ishmael and 
Browne. When Ishmael, scientifically incorrect, concludes that “the whale is a fish, and call upon 
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holy Jonah to back me” (111), he is parodying the purpose of scientific analysis. He adopts a 
view because it is simple or comforting. He also pushes the reader to consider truths they hold 
without knowing why.11 The implicit question arising from Ishmael’s truth is pragmatic: What is 
the benefit of believing something scientifically true if it doesn’t bring existential comfort? In a 
similar fashion, Browne argues that all humans “have their Tutelary, and Guardian Angels” even 
though this belief is “not manifestly defined in Scripture, yet it is an opinion of a good and 
wholesome use in the course of actions of a mans life, and would serve as an hypothesis to salve 
many doubts” (101). Browne’s belief in guardian angels is not derived from orthodox 
hermeneutics, yet it brings comfort. Ishmael, following Browne’s example, anticipates pragmatic 
methodology. Similar to William James’ central tenet of pragmatism, “If no practical difference 
whatever can be traced, the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle” 
(Pragmatism 26), whether a whale is a fish or a mammal doesn’t actually effect most 
individuals. Where they differ is in action. Ishmael’s sometimes gives personal experience as the 
reasons for believing something, such as in “The Fountain,” a chapter analyzed later in detail, 
where Ishmael argues that whale spouts emit mist because he’s seen steam arise from his head 
when thinking hard (280). Browne relies not on experience, but often reminds the reader that his 
ideas come solely from “reason.” Reason as the measure of truth doesn’t prevent Browne from 
presenting unorthodox ideas, but they also limit him. Ishmael dares to record Moby-Dick’s rising 
from the water and gives great detail to a creature until that moment lurking beneath the story, 
whereas Browne, writing about God’s hiddenness argues that “to pry into the maze of his 
Counsels, is not onely folly in Man, but presumption even in Angels” (75). Ishmael goes beyond 
Browne’s limitations by recording the experiences of confronting the seemingly impossible.  
 
11 A primary purpose of literary parody, according to Bakhtin, analyzed later in this section. 
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 Formally, Ishmael emulates Browne’s prose. The form is rebellious by eschewing 
rational and strictly logical ruminations. Ishmael infuses whimsical puns, oxymorons, and 
alliteration throughout his narration. Scholar Brian Foley notes that Browne’s style features 
“recurrent alliteration and frequent parallelism. In particular… uniting sound and sense to create 
an effect normally achieved only in poetry” (269).12 Ishmael mimics the motion of the seas and 
the whale’s spout when he writes, “the waves rolled by like scrolls of silver; and, by their soft, 
suffusing seethings, made what seemed a silvery silence, not a solitude: on such a silent night a 
silvery jet was seen far in advance of the white bubbles at the bow” (183). When read out loud, 
the cadence, meter, rhythm, alliteration, and internal rhymes coalesce into a vivid poetic image. 
Browne, reacting against seventeenth-century academic writing, also opts for poetic meditations.  
 The style and function of Ishmael’s parodic essays are critiques of hierarchical, scientific, 
and literary language. Other scholars note this trend of critique, but attribute it to textually 
suspicious historical or sociological causes. Dawn Coleman suggests that “Romantic irony marks 
Ishmael’s sermons both in their fascination with the frightening, uncontrollable realities lurking 
behind everyday appearances…and in their meditative, exploratory tone and provisional 
conclusions” (137). Note that Coleman calls Ishmael’s digressive chapter “sermons.” While the 
descriptions Coleman uses, “uncontrollable realities…meditative, exploratory…provisional 
conclusions,” all describe elements of Ishmael’s digressions, they are not sermonic. To view 
Ishmael’s essays as sermonic creates the false impression that Ishmael is attempting to teach the 
reader some grand spiritual lesson or, as Coleman writes, Ishmael, “turn[s] the reading process 
itself into something like a religious ritual” (140). Formally Coleman gives no examples of what 
this ritual looks like.  
 
12 For more detail on the poetic similarities, see Foley’s article, particularly pages 268-271. 
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 Ishmael blends blasphemous humor and somber observations of both the natural world 
and spiritual phenomena to give his essays an atmosphere of jocular seriousness. Coleman 
seemingly agrees, “Terror haunts [Ishmael’s] preaching, as when he exhorts readers not to look 
too long into the artificial fire…or cautions them against pushing off from the inner island of 
‘peace and joy’ into the ‘horrors of the half known life’” (137). However, the language here is 
explicitly not echoing Protestant theology, but Platonic philosophy. Ishmael is arguing, tongue-
in-cheek, that it is wise to live the “unexamined life” that Socrates argues is not worth living. In 
other words, ignorance is bliss; but given Ishmael’s continual intellectual searching, and the joy 
he finds through his musings,13 this isn’t a serious statement. Coleman does admit that 
“[Ishmael’s] sermons are exploratory, playfully ruminating over ideas then concluding with 
heterodox counsel” (137). This is true, not because he emulates sermons, but rather the influence 
of renaissance non-fiction writing. Part of Browne’s rhetorical strategy is highlighting, over and 
over again, that he is not giving a sermon or writing theology, but presenting own thoughts, 
allowing for humorous non-instructive ideas that are nonetheless entertaining and enlightening. 
“I am of that reformed new-cast Religion, wherein I dislike nothing but the name” (61), Browne 
writes humorously, something a sermon could not do. Reducing Ishmael’s multifarious essays as 
“sermons” denies them the complexity, and constant shifting of styles which they present 
throughout the novel. Were it more relevant, I would suggest that Coleman’s evaluations are 
remarkably helpful for the actual sermon in Moby-Dick. Father Mapple’s sermon contains both 
humor and melancholy, along with genre-mixing (Biblical exegesis, sailor-songs, hymns) and 
 
13 The later section on “Ironic Springs of Wisdom” explicitly addresses how the essays are the stepping 
stones to actually living out a fulfilling life. 
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subversive critiques of religion. Melville’s most profound critique of religious sermons is found, 
directly, in the genre of religious sermon.  
 Ishmael’s mix of conversational language (his aforementioned conversation with Peter 
Coffin, for instance) with Shakespearean or biblical language (Ahab’s monologues), 
demonstrate, rather than sermons that are ironically non-sermonic, heteroglossic essays; this too 
stems from Browne. Samuel Johnson writes of Browne that “His style is, indeed, a tissue of 
many languages; a mixture of heterogeneous words, brought together from distant regions, with 
terms originally appropriated to one art, and drawn by violence into the service of another” 
(508). This fusion of traditionally high and low languages creates a “lifelike concreteness” and a 
“naturalistic quality” to Moby-Dick (Dialogic 365). The realism produced by uncertain voices 
allows everyday figures, like Ishmael, to rebel against orthodox cultural norms, but he also 
infuses sailors, like Ahab, with Shakespearean literariness. When colloquial and “epic’ language 
combine “[w]hat inevitably happens is a decay and collapse of the religious, political, and 
ideological authority connected with that [orthodox] language” and during this process the 
“language consciousness of prose art ripens, finding its support in the social heteroglossia of 
national languages that are actually spoken” (Dialogic 370). Ishmael’s parody destroys the 
exclusivity of old-beliefs, paving the way for inclusivity. Similar to Browne’s humanistic 
declaration that “I could never divide my selfe from any man upon the difference of an opinion” 
since “I have no genius to disputes in Religion” (65), Ishmael learns to love other cultures by 
abandoning the hierarchy of religious language and beliefs; “[Queequeg] has just as much reason 
to fear me, as I have to be afraid of him. Better sleep with a sober cannibal than a drunken 
Christian” (33). The dialogic provides a frame for ethical tolerance. Ishmael’s use of 
dramaturgical devices further unifies humanity through linguistic difference.  
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 While Browne and Ishmael clearly echo one another, their essays differ in their logical 
reasoning. Browne wrote to defend himself from the charge of atheism (Browne 61). The 
insertion of heterodox views are defended by his pleading ignorance in cases where others might 
think him wrong to hold such beliefs. Browne never gives the reader what Ishmael later gives in 
plenty: concrete examples of how essayistic musings effect everyday ethics and experience.  
 
 
The Function of Dramaturgy 
 Explicitly using the dramatic format, Ishmael compares and contrasts the crew’s attitudes 
towards the perils of whaling and chasing the monstrous Moby-Dick. Considering the four 
chapters which follow one after the other: “Sunset,” “Dusk,” “First Night-Watch,” and 
“Midnight, Forecastle” we see a miniature play, influenced by Shakespeare, using iambic 
pentameter, stage directions, and inserted poetry. At this point Ishmael becomes less of a 
character, seldom appearing in scenes and leaving himself out of the plot, instead proclaiming 
that he is the dramatist of the novel: “Oh, Ahab! What shall be grand in thee, it must needs be 
plucked at from the skies, and dived for in the deep, and featured in the unbodied air!” (120). 
The four chapters which follow each other show that individuals adopt truths based their place in 
the social hierarchy, their surroundings, and personal experience. These inherited beliefs are not 
necessarily the most comforting, but they are true for those who hold them.  
 First is “Sunset,” a chapter which consists solely of a monologue spoken by Ahab. 
Introduced by a stage direction in italics, “The cabin; by the stern windows; Ahab sitting alone, 
and gazing out,” (135) there is an immediate connection to Shakespeare. Like the potentially 
mad, self-loathing, and manic-depressive Lear or Hamlet, Ahab mourns that “all loveliness is 
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anguish to me, since I can ne’er enjoy. Gifted with the highest perception, I lack the low, 
enjoying power” (136). Because he believes that Moby-Dick is the representation of all ills, and 
that the only way to conquer this all-powerful being is to kill it, Ahab is unable to enjoy life until 
it is dead. His “higher perception” and his firm belief in the duty to kill Moby-Dick makes him 
realize how he looks to those around him: “They think me mad—Starbuck does; but I’m 
demoniac, I am madness maddened!” (136). Ahab fully embraces his insanity and unshakable 
understanding of divinity, accepting that he must confront the whale. Ahab’s belief that killing 
Moby-Dick is a “fixed purpose…laid with iron rails, whereon my soul is grooved to run” (136), 
is ironic, as other chapters show. It is completely within his power to turn away and not hunt the 
whale, but his fundamental belief in the demiurgical God behind the pasteboard mask prevents 
him from using free-will to end his hunt. Ahab’s language is ironically Calvinistic: he believes 
there is a divine plan predestining him to rebel against God; his conviction, rooted in his inability 
to accept uncertainty concerning the existence of evil prevents him from choosing a pragmatic 
belief that could lead to a happier life. 
 The next chapter is also a monologue, this time spoken by Starbuck, the first mate. 
Similarly beginning with an italicized stage-direction, Starbuck is alone, in terror of Ahab. 
Starbuck is a passive bystander to tragedy, keen but unable or unwilling, like Hamlet’s Polonius, 
to do anything about Ahab’s certain “impious end” (137). Struggling with the fact that Ahab is 
his superior and therefore cannot, according to biblical ethics, rebel against him, Starbuck prays 
they never find the whale. The stage direction “A burst of revelry from the forecastle” interrupts 
Starbuck’s musing. He then turns his anguish to the crew: “to sail with such a heathen crew that 
have small touch of human mothers in them! Whelped somewhere by the sharkish sea. … the 
infernal orgies! that revelry is forward!” (137). Starbuck is critical of the crew’s ability to enjoy 
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themselves while Ahab forces the hunt on them. Starbuck warns Ahab that “To be enraged with 
a dumb thing, Captain Ahab, seems blasphemous” (133). Starbuck uses common sense and 
theology to justify, rightly, the stupidity of Ahab’s quest. Yet Starbuck himself is immobilized 
by Calvinist orthodoxy, preventing him from stopping Ahab. Starbuck’s belief in providence, 
like Ahab’s, prevents him from willing a pragmatic belief. Resigning from taking action against 
Ahab, he calls on God, “Stand by me, hold me, bind me, O ye blessed influences” (137). 
Starbuck’s downfall is twofold: an inability to take proper action against Ahab’s evil because of 
an overt trust in providence, and an inability to enjoy life, represented by the crew’s revelry he 
disdains, fearing transgression against orthodox morality.  
 The third chapter in the play, “First Night-Watch” features a monologuing Stubb, who in 
contrast to Ahab and Starbuck, is not wrapped up in dread. Rather, he is laughing, “Why so? 
Because a laugh’s the wisest, easiest answer to all that’s queer” (137). Stubb stands unafraid of 
the white whale. While Stubb’s cheerful-nihilism helps him cope with the reality of death, Stubb 
represents William James’ description of the subjective-pragmatist, someone who “take[s] a 
moral holiday… let[s] the world wag in its own way, feeling that its issues are in better hands 
than ours and are none of our business (Pragmatism 82). Stubb’s beliefs benefit nobody but 
himself; they neither prevent tyranny nor provide comfort to others. Stubb is the premier 
example of someone who greedily hordes truth and laughs at the world’s misery. In contrast to 
Ishmael’s embrace of the other, Stubb is selfish and mocking, demonstrated during his later 
interaction with the cook, one of the few black men on the boat. Stubb persists in teasing and 
making fun of the cook’s “simple Christianity” while waiting for him to cook parts of a whale 
(228). This teasing first embarrasses the cook, but then, through understandable hatred, becomes 
a desire for Stubb to get eaten by a whale: “whale eat him, ‘stead of him eat whale. I’m bressed if 
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he ain’t more of a shark dan Massa Shark hisself” (230). Stubb’s nihilism breeds selfishness and 
hatred between the crew. He’s also indifferent towards tyranny; after Stubb’s dream of a 
pyramid-shaped Ahab kicking his behind, Stubb concludes “the best thing you can do… is to let 
that old man alone” (108). Stubb’s indifference harms others with its lack of moral 
responsibility. 
 The fourth chapter of this mini-play is titled “Midnight, Forecastle.” Instead of 
monologues, the reader confronts an active, comic dialogue between the crew. The use of 
lighthearted stage-directions (describing characters as “lounging, leaning, and lying” and “sulky 
and sleepy”) and inserted songs, indicate Shakespearean comedy rather than tragedy, a space 
inhabited by battles of wit. Instead of Stubb’s solipsism, the crew bonds through conversation 
and laughter, finding comfort amidst fear. The Bakhtinian concept of literary carnival is 
applicable to this chapter. Indeed, viewing it in light of carnival elucidates how a display of the 
crew separated from authority presents them as ritualistically inverting the status quo by 
celebrating cultural difference and mocking authority figures. 
 The microcosm of the Pequod is on full display in this chapter: sailors from Nantucket, 
New York, Denmark, France, Iceland, Malta, Sicily, Portugal, China, India, Tahiti, Spain, 
England, and Ireland all join together in a hearty and jovial dialogue. Aside from their 
multiculturalism, the crew bonds over songs, drink, and shared yearning for sexual experiences. 
There are no metaphysical qualms or epistemological anxieties. Rather, Ishmael invites the 
reader to a scene of comic dialogues. For instance, they’re hesitant to dance because of the lack 
of women. The sailor from Malta, in response to the rough waves, yells, “Now would all the 
waves were women, then I’d go drown” which causes a Tahitian sailor to respond, “Hail, holy 
nakedness of our dancing girls!” (141). Despite the lack of girls the crew dance together. The 
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crew’s revelry, annoying to Starbuck and ignored by Stubb, creates a homosocial haven from 
Ahab’s agonizing theology. 
 Non-white characters mock the absurdity of white people’s behaviors, another instance of 
cultural inversion. Tashtego, a Native American, looking at the dancing crew smokes quietly and 
says, “that’s a white man; he calls that fun: humph! I save my sweat” (140). And Pip, the black 
boy from Alabama, confused by the crew’s revelry and absurd behavior, notes that “there they 
go, all cursing, and here I don’t. Fine prospect to ‘em; they’re on the road to heaven” he then 
pleads to the “big white God aloft there somewhere in yon darkness, have mercy on this small 
black boy down here; preserve him from all men that have no bowels to feel fear!” (143-44). 
Instead of whites remarking that their non-white companions are strange, the non-white 
characters remark that the whites act absurd. This carnivalized inversion offers a window into the 
camaraderie that Ishmael praises as a key tenet to ethics despite the lack of epistemological 
certainty.14 
 These four chapters in conjunction with one another demonstrate Melville’s dialogic 
poetics. The reader moves from Ahab’s pessimistic fundamentalism, to Starbuck’s paralyzed 
Calvinism, to Stubb’s cheerful indifference, and finally to the crew’s genuine happiness despite 
the ubiquity of death. Like how Bakhtin notes that “dramatic juxtaposition” (Problems 28) 
allows the reader to gain insight into the motivations and reasoning behind different characters’ 
beliefs, these chapters demonstrate how the whole crew copes with the reality of death while 
 
14 Scholar Bainard Cowan also interprets this scene as an instance of carnival. The revelry of the crew 
disrupts Ahab s rule of magnetism and awe [which] pervades every psychic inch wherein one might hope 
to find refuge from nature” (117-118). Although Cowan suggests that the carnivalized attitude of the crew 
are negated by the end of the novel because an invisible, unmanifested god prevails in the last page” 
(176), it s apparent that Ishmael portrays the carnivalesque positively as the equal voices of the crew 
interact with one another freely, finding joy in the face of impending doom. 
   
34 
whaling. By giving the crew’s revelry the final word, Ishmael prepares the reader for his own 
approach to truth that does not rest in rational certainty or nihilism, but an agnostic pragmatism 
that benefits both the self and others. 
 The purpose of these dialogic poetics isn’t to suggest that one worldview is truer than 
another. Although the four chapters demonstrate Ahab and Starbuck’s blind adherence to 
certainty, they are not represented as necessarily wrong (there is an evil whale lurking the seas), 
they merely suffer more for their approach to truth. Stubb’s monologue is remarkably unserious 
while the dialogues of the multicultural crew show joviality. Bainard Cowan writes, “Rabelais 
does not advocate laughter as a wise corrective to harsh truths” (137) and neither does Ishmael, 
carnivalized laughter serves a purpose. The essays in Moby-Dick are not philosophical 
guidebooks. Instead, the essays are entertaining models for truth-seeking that neither dismiss the 
unavoidable seriousness of life, nor obsesses over evil. Like the dictionary definitions in the 
“Etymology” sketch, Ishmael’s essays present different but equally potential truths. 
 
 
Ironic Springs of Wisdom: Homoeroticism and Mock-Spirituality 
 One might wonder, however, where Ishmael is getting these new methodologies of truth 
if they prefigure the schools of agnosticism and pragmatism. “Whence then cometh wisdom? and 
where is the place of understanding?” the interlude of Job asks. Ishmael, who’s “whale-ship was 
my Yale College and my Harvard,” (95) finds true wisdom, not in through the hierarchically 
educated individual’s prized “reason,” like Montaigne or Browne, but in the mundane activities 
of work. The chapter, “A Squeeze of the Hand,” bluntly shows that work and camaraderie offer 
both homosocial bonding and paths towards pragmatic truth. 
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 Like other chapters, Ishmael begins with an everyday working activity, in this case the 
action of squeezing whale oil to soften it before boiling it down, before transitioning to 
metaphysical speculation. While squeezing sperm with his shipmates, Ishmael enjoys the work to 
the point of an out-of-body-experience. In ecstasy, Ishmael reports that “I forgot all about our 
horrible oath; in that inexpressible sperm, I washed my hands and my heart of it… I felt divinely 
free from all ill-will, or petulence, or malice, of any sort whatsoever” (309). Proceeding to 
“Squeeze! squeeze! squeeze!” Ishmael then finds himself “unwittingly squeezing my co-
laborers’ hands in it, mistaking their hands for the gentle globules.” There is also a homoerotic 
revelation: “Such an abounding… loving feeling did this avocation beget; that at last I was 
continually squeezing their hands, and looking into their eyes sentimentally; as much as to say,—
Oh! My dear fellow beings, why should we longer cherish any social acerbities, or know the 
slightest ill-humor or envy!” A working activity becomes a sexual activity, which results in an 
ecstatic mock-religious vision wherein Ishmael reaches enlightenment: “I have perceived that in 
all cases man must eventually lower, or at least shift, his conceit of attainable felicity; not placing 
it anywhere in the intellect or the fancy; but in the wife, the heart, the bed, the table, the saddle, 
the fire-side, the country” and finally, echoing the revery of the prophet Ezekiel: “In thoughts of 
visions of the night, I saw long rows of angels in paradise, each with his hands in a jar of 
spermaceti” (309). Like Queequeq and Ishmael’s mock-marriage, this prophetic announcement is 
humorous yet sincerely advocates a new, unorthodox, truth. 
 The pleasures which Ishmael invokes, “the wife, the heart, the bed… [etc.]” (309) are the 
very things that spur Ahab’s melancholy when he considers giving up the chase. Remembrance 
of family spurs Ahab into melancholy reflection, “that young first-wife I wedded past fifty, and 
sailed for Cape Horn the next day, leaving but one dent in my marriage pillow—wife? wife?—
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rather a widow with her husband alive!” (389). Starbuck jumps at the opportunity to persuade 
Ahab to return, “why should any one give chase to that hated fish! Away with me! … let us 
home! Wife and child, too, are Starbuck’s…” (389). Despite Starbuck’s pleading, “Ahab’s 
glance was averted” (390) and he determines to keep hunting Moby-Dick, doomed to die either 
way. Whereas Ishmael meditations, rooted in mundane, earthly experience, offer an escape from 
overtly-metaphysical speculation, Ahab and Starbuck’s obsession with the divine, both negative 
and positive, paralyze them from saving themselves, and others, from peril. 
 The joys Ishmael invokes are epicurean. They are also pragmatically not rooted in 
abstract intellectual ideas, but rather attainable physical pleasures. Praising pleasure over 
needless pain contrasts with Starbuck and Ahab, who suffer because of their acceptances of fate. 
Coleman’s argument that “consistently, Ishmael’s sermons draw on stoicism…established back 
in ‘Loomings’ when Ishmael assures us that making the transition from schoolmaster to sailor 
‘requires a strong decoction of Seneca and the Stoics to enable you to grin and bear it’ (139). 
Coleman fails to see this is a persistent joke in Moby-Dick: stoicism, although emphasizing 
rationality, is actually an irrational outlook. I’m surprised that Coleman doesn’t see stoicism as 
an avenue to critique the stereotype of Calvinistic-endurance without explicitly referring to 
Calvinism. Instead, “in assigning Ishmael stoic sermons, Melville may have found inspiration in 
Seneca’s maxims praising the value of sound advice” (139).15 Yet, in the first paragraph of the 
 
15 The other examples of “stoicism” in Ishmael’s essays, Coleman acknowledges sound like Platonism 
(two systems of thought so vastly different its odd they conflate them). It is worth pointing out the other 
example, with no Platonic qualifier, they refer to: “The exhortation to equanimity at the end of 'The 
Blanket” is classic Senecan teaching, as in, A good man is happy within himself, and independent upon 
fortune” (139).  
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first chapter, Ishmael humorously states that “With a philosophical flourish Cato throws himself 
upon his sword; I quietly take to the ship” (16).16 Ishmael’s cure for the drizzly November of his 
soul, depression, is not passive endurance, it is action. Specifically, he finds whatever naturally 
brings him the simplest pleasure, costs no money, and takes the least dramatic path: “I go to sea a 
simple sailor” (18). Ishmael’s simple joys of life are only interrupted by a monomaniacal and 
inverted Calvinist; likewise Starbuck, the one person who could stop this monomaniacal maniac, 
can’t because he accepts fate and the hierarchy of authority. To argue Ishmael supports a stoic 
attitude undermines Ishmael’s jovial depictions of joy found through non-intellectual activities: 
communal bonding through work and dialogue. Placing Melville within a strict historical schema 
with arbitrary confines on literature’s potentiality for expression creates confusion and limited 
readings. Though Ishmael’s serious meditations are indeed strikingly serious, his comical ones 
can go over readers who pigeonhole him as a non-stop Calvinist critiquing preacher.17  
 Ishmael’s exhortation of simple joys echoes the epistemological problem that James 
attempts to fix. Rationalistic, philosophical musings are “a classic sanctuary in which the 
 
Coleman does not quote the passage and therefore twists Ishmael’s jokes into serious statements. Again, 
Ishmael immediately undermines his serious statements. After some short paradoxical maxims, like 
“remain warm among ice” and “be cool at the equator.” Ishmael then says, “how easy and how hopeless 
to teach these fine things! Of erections, how few are domed like St. Peter’s! How few vast as the whale” 
(236). Aside from the bawdy pun on how large “erections” are both rare and subject to change quickly, 
like how human humors, or passions, quickly change from heat to cold, it also reinforces that humans, 
which aren’t whales, cannot be stoic. A more direct influence is Shakespeare, who also bawdily compares 
the quick metamorphoses of human passions to sexual intercourse: “Th’expense of spirit in a waste of 
shame / Is lust in action; / and till action, lust is perjured… Enjoyed no sooner but depsisèd straight” 
(“129” 1-3, 5). He also reinforces that humans can’t escape this dilemma because they are human: “All 
the world well know, yet none knows well / To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell” (13-14). 
 
 
16 Parker’s note on this passage: “The suicide of this Roman statesman-soldier…after his defeat in battle, 
exemplified his Stoic philosophy. Stoicism is the belief that people should uncomplainingly accept all 
events as the unavoidable results of divine will” (16).  
 
 
17 See Lawrence Thompson’s Melville’s Quarrel With God, which makes this argument.  
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rationalist fancy may take refuge from the intolerably confused and gothic character which mere 
facts [i.e., reality] present” (Pragmatism 57). Too much rationalization is no more than “a 
remedy, a way of escape” from the “tangled, muddy, painful, and perplexed” presence of 
suffering in nature (57). Ahab assigns all earthly ills to Moby-Dick to rationalize evil; yet instead 
of over-interpreting the meaning of evil, Ishmael resembles James’ pragmatism since he 
“preserves as cordial a relation with facts” and simultaneously “neither begins nor ends by 
turning positive religious constructions out of doors—it treats them cordially as well” (66). 
Squeezing sperm is a real, material experience that leads Ishmael to genuine spiritual insight. 
 Because of Ishmael’s ecumenical humanism, and his ability to find revelation in actions 
as mundane as squeezing sperm, some scholars label him a pantheist. For example, Brian 
Yothers argues that Moby-Dick preaches pantheism by placing “human connectedness… [as] the 
grounds for the moment that transcends ordinary human experience” (90). Pantheism, as 
Melville understood it, suggests an optimistic theological belief that does not match the nuanced 
ruminations of Ishmael.18 Nature, portrayed by Ishmael, is not wholly divine, and therefore is not 
worthy of worship. Ishmael’s approach to pantheism is nearly identical to William James’ 
pragmatic solution to oneness (pantheism). James writes, “[pragmatism] must equally abjure 
absolute monism and absolute pluralism” (71). So long as there are elements of disunity or evil, 
the pragmatist cannot say whether the world is monistic or pluralistic, “Some day…a universe 
consolidated in every conceivable way, may turn out to be the most acceptable of all hypotheses. 
Meanwhile the opposite hypothesis, of a world imperfectly unified still, and perhaps always to 
 
18 Concerning Goethe’s statement that humanity must “live in the All,” Melville wrote to Hawthorne: 
“What nonsense! Here is a fellow with a raging toothache. ‘My dear boy,’ Goethe says to him, ‘you are 
sorely afflicted with that toothache, but you must live in the all, and then you will be happy” 
(Correspondence 193 qtd. in Yothers 91). Goethe’s idealism is not practical, ignoring even the lowest 
pains of humanity, and offering no remedy. 
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remain so, must be sincerely entertained” (123). Entertained, but not necessarily true, James’ 
position is agnostic in the sense of Huxley’s definition. The pragmatist is waiting for “the final 
empirical ascertainment of just what the balance of union and disunion among things may be” 
(123). In the meantime, a pragmatist is in “the common-sense world, in which we find things 
partly joined and early disjoined” (123). Similarly, Ishmael describes pantheistic oneness, such 
as on the mast-head, where “by the blending cadence of waves with thoughts, that at last [one] 
loses his identity; takes the mystic ocean at his feet for the visible image of that deep, blue, 
bottomless soul, pervading mankind and nature” (129). However, this portrait of oneness is 
disrupted: “Over Descartian vortices you hover. And perhaps, at mid-day, in the fairest weather, 
with one half throttled shriek you drop through that transparent air into the summer sea, no more 
to rise for ever,” and Ishmael warns, “Heed it well, ye Pantheists!” (129), warning that optimistic 
pantheism ignores the reality of death. Likewise, while Ishmael feels a unity in squeezing his co-
laborer’s hands, still there is “universal cannibalism… all whose creatures prey upon each other, 
carrying on eternal war since the world began” (215). Ishmael, aware of visible and invisible 
elements of unity and disunity, cannot share Emerson’s declaration that “Nature never wears a 
mean appearance. Neither does the wisest man extort her secret, and lose his curiosity by finding 
out all her perfection” (9). Were Ishmael to adopt optimistic pantheism, he would turn a blind 
eye to the disunity or “cannibalism” in the apparent oneness of the world. 
  Ishmael’s digressions are still opportunities for celebrating the natural wonders of the 
world despite evil. “The Fountain,” a digressive chapter unconcerned with the plot, finds Ishmael 
analyzing whale spouts. He wonders why nobody can tell with certainty “whether these 
spoutings are, after all, really water, or nothing but vapor” (277). Ishmael, after describing the 
whale’s spout scientifically, enters a dialogue with himself: “But why pester one with all this 
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reasoning on the subject? Speak out! You have seen him spout; then declare what the spout is, 
can you not tell water from air?” In response, Ishmael calmly says, “My dear sir, in this world it 
is not so easy to settle these plain things. I have ever found your plain things the knottiest of all” 
(279). Ishmael acknowledges that both empirical study and abstract speculation are not enough 
to know a thing in itself. Perhaps Hume’s argument that “[even] stupid peasants… improve by 
experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing” (Enquiry 25), will suffice. 
But Ishmael rejects experience: “the spout is deemed poisonous” because the pressure from it 
can peel off skin and blind you if it gets in your eyes (280). Instead, “The wisest thing the 
investigator can do then, it seems to me, is to let this deadly spout alone” (280). Lacking 
knowledge, Ishmael nonetheless resolves the meditation.19 
 Despite the inability to experience the spout, “We can hypothesize, even if we cannot 
prove and establish” (280). Ishmael concludes that the spout “is nothing but mist” (280). His 
reason for this is rooted in self-formed truth rather than experience or metaphysical speculation. 
Because the sperm whale is “no common, shallow being” but instead “ponderous and profound,” 
Ishmael concludes that, like “Plato, Pyrrho, the Devil, Jupiter, Dante, and so on, there always 
goes up a certain semi-visible steam, while in the act of thinking deep thoughts” (280). The 
comical vision of steam rising from the heads of controversial figures is Ishmael’s argument that 
the sperm whale emits mist, not water. Ishmael, comparing himself to those aforementioned 
steam-raising figures, shifts tone, “[w]hile composing a little treatise on Eternity, I had the 
curiosity to place a mirror before me; and ere long saw reflected there, a curious involved 
worming and undulation in the atmosphere over my head” (280). Ishmael’s isolated experience 
 
19 While Obenzinger leaves his interpretation of the chapter at this point, writing, "The search for 
knowledge is dangerous. […] The constant presence of death frames the search for meaning; we all stare 
into the void, and the true seeker knows that death can arrive at any moment” (186), the progression of 
the chapter reveals quite the opposite. 
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doesn’t use scientific facts, nor is it blindly holding onto a common orthodox conviction, similar 
to Browne.20 At the end of the chapter, Ishmael gives a credo of his beliefs:  
“through all the thick mists of the dim doubts in my mind, divine intuitions now and then 
shoot, enkindling my fog with a heavenly ray. And for this I thank God; for all have 
doubts; many deny; but doubts or denials, few along with them, have intuitions. Doubts 
of all things earthly, and intuitions of some things heavenly; this combination makes 
neither believer nor infidel, but makes a man who regards both with equal eye” (280). 
Ishmael lacks certainty, following only intuition. This pragmatic truth-seeking brings both 
internal peace and tolerance. Ishmael’s pragmatic view of religion is a healthy alternative to 
Ahab’s certainty. Moby-Dick is not Lawrence’s tragic tale of “Doom! Doom! Doom!” but rather 
“Squeeze! Squeeze! Squeeze!” It cautions readers against certainty. The tension of not knowing 
and desiring knowledge is positive. Ishmael’s growth into tolerance begins by turning his desires 
away from the inscrutable, and towards the pleasures in front of him.  
  
 
20 For example, Browne s understanding of the Trinity rests in his belief that there is in us, if not three 
distinct soules, yet differing faculties…and yet in us are so united as to make but one soule and 
substance” (73) Browne admits this is a personal conjecture beyond reason, and confesses that he likes his 
answer because I have often admired the mysticall way of Pythagoras, and the secret Magicke of 
numbers” (73). 









“THEOLOGY, ART THOU SO BLIND?” 
 
THE AGONY OF AGNOSTICISM IN CLAREL 
 
 
 Melville never again reached the monetary or literary success he achieved with his 
romantic travelogues such as Typee (1846). A book which one reviewer in 1858 argued “is the 
best” of Melville’s works. Meanwhile, the same anonymous reviewer says The Confidence-Man 
(1857) is “decidedly the worst” (“Dismally Monotonous” 290). In the remarkably short period 
from 1849-1857, Melville, writing furiously, completed all the prose-fiction that appeared in his 
life. Despite the impressive output, his career quickly fell out of favor due to his increasing 
strangeness, experimentalism, and as critics saw it, pessimism. As George Washington Peck 
writes in his review of Moby-Dick’s follow up, Pierre (1852), “A bad book! Affected in dialect, 
unnatural in conception, repulsive in plot, and inartistic in construction. Such is Mr. Melville’s 
latest work” (432). In 1858, an anonymous reviewer of The Confidence-Man writes that 
Melville, while “the oddest, most unique” writer of the period, nevertheless appears as someone 
who is “not in love or sympathy with his kind” (“A Writer” 285). 
 These critics, while not charitable towards the increasingly experimental themes and 
styles of Melville’s later prose, were right to note the philosophical skepticism and pessimism. 
The bad press, however, contributed to Melville’s failure as an author. He received “not a penny” 
for The Confidence-Man (Parker 629) and after his last sea-faring adventure to the Holy Land, he 
returned depressed and “never regained his former vigor or strength” (629). Moving into poetry, 
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his first collection Battle Pieces (1866) was “poorly received.” His publisher “did not pay for the 
war poems they printed” (630). Destitute, in 1866 Melville took a desk-job as a custom officer in 
New York City, where he worked for nineteen years, composing the poem Clarel while at his 
office (630). 
 A biographical reading yields many interesting guesses about Clarel’s reason for 
existence, the potential solace it gave Melville,21 or the wisdom it might teach its readers. 
However, not letting Melville’s personal crises sway the text of Clarel, we can use these 
historical details to see, to some extent, why Clarel is such a strange work. Melville, not writing 
for money and with no audience to please, had free reign with Clarel’s subject matter and style. 
The moody, droning, eight-syllable lines of tetrameter featured in Clarel, written during a time 
when Longfellow’s ballads and long poems in iambic pentameter verse were all the rage, makes 
them stand out as formally fascinating choices for an epic and deeply philosophical work.  
 
 
The Scholarly Conversations of Clarel 
Using dialogic poetics to show how more voices in an increasingly secular society 
multiply the potential truths, Clarel pessimistically suggests that no worldview or religion can 
bring authentic existential comfort. Against William James argument that one can will 
themselves into belief, Clarel tragically demonstrates that when the number of potential truths 
 
21 The comically biased Melville’s Religious Journey argues that Clarel’s despair is nothing more than a 
“working through” of difficult questions that would ultimately lead Melville to make “personal and 
literary peace with the unitarian church and with God, through his own personal discoveries" (Kring 18). 
The author just so happens to be a Unitarian minister at the same Unitarian church Melville’s wife 
attended.  
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rises, this task becomes near-impossible. The amount of “live-wires” poses threats of electric 
shock rather than solace. 
 The plot of Clarel is sparse despite its 18,000 lines divided into four books. An American 
theology student, Clarel, staying in a Jerusalem hostel to revive his waning faith, broods alone. 
He reluctantly notes, disillusioned, “‘Other cheer / Than that anticipated here’” (I.i.19-20) 
prevents his spiritual revival. Deciding to explore his surroundings, Clarel meets a Jewish girl 
named Ruth, who he quickly falls in love with. However, her father Nathan, an ex-deist turned 
Zionist, is killed by local Muslims. Due Jewish mourning customs, Clarel is not allowed to visit 
Ruth. So, to pass the time and maybe find spiritual relief, he goes on a guided tour of the Holy 
Land with a large cast of characters. The majority of the poem, books two, three, and four, 
follow Clarel and other pilgrims as they discuss theological, philosophical, and historical matters 
while passing famous sites, such as Sodom, Mar Saba, and the Via Crucis. Despite only lasting 
ten days, three pilgrims die of bizarre, symbolic causes during the journey. When Clarel returns 
to Jerusalem, he finds that Ruth, upset over Clarel leaving, died of heartbreak. Clarel, in despair 
and confusion, journeys into a dark alley, and the plot of the poem ends. A brief epilogue musing 
on the relationship between science and religious faith closes the poem.  
 Despite the tragic plot of the poem, scholars are quick to find hope between the lines of 
despair.22 For instance, Yothers, while admitting the poem ends tragically and, on the surface, 
unresolved, suggests that “Clarel has an almost mystical experience of the reality of religious 
pluralism” and that Melville “leaves the confrontation between religious pluralism as a source of 
hope” (178-179). Potter, using new historicism, relies on comparative religious studies in the 
 
22 Since my reading of Clarel is primarily formal, I interact with book-length works centering on the 
structure of the poem as a whole. Recent articles, though relatively few in number, focus more intently on 
certain characters or poetic images. Such as “Calculated Dialogues: Derwent s Imaginary Conversations 
in Clarel” by Dennis Berthold, which is dealt with in this chapter. 
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nineteenth-century to suggest that Clarel ends with a celebration of the “Intersympathy of 
creeds” wherein “by the end of the poem, Clarel has gone from suffering in solitude in the first 
canto to being part of the great cosmic march of human and animal pilgrims…each bearing its 
own cross” (19). In other words, the poem is a recognition of, and celebration of, the universality 
of human suffering, and the need embrace this ubiquitous trait of existence. However, Potter 
misreads the ending of Clarel, somehow not acknowledging that Clarel actually turns away from 
the train of sufferers in defiance. The aforementioned critics often invoke Kierkegaard in their 
reading of Clarel, suggesting that Clarel advocates an existential Christian faith.23 Formally, 
however, the poem explicitly critiques this absurdist or existentialist approach to religion as 
ultimately unsatisfying.  
 This chapter stresses the dialogic poetics Melville employs throughout Clarel. Other 
scholars note the dialogic elements,24 but these critics abandon the function of dialogic poetics by 
suggesting the poem advocates or reveals a specific worldview Melville held.25 However, the 
dialogues are consistently inconclusive. Instead of advocating for a particular theological or 
 
23 Joseph G. Knapp, an influential early scholar of the poem, suggests that Clarel advocates a religion of 
endurance: The Christianity that Melville found was…a promise of the same fate that befell its founder. 
… Christ s suffering and man s suffering provide not only a community of suffering but a connaturality of 
knowledge” (115). Knapp s reading is absurdist, suggesting a Camus-like image of Melville s insistence 
that humans continue to endure suffering despite its endless and unassuageable nature. 
 
 
24 Yothers writes, Melville uses a dialogic poetics that explores the sacred spaces of the Holy Land…’” 
(171). Goldman argues that It is more rewarding to read Clarel not as poetry, which some discourse 
theorists including Bakhtin view as monological, but as a narrative verse that contains the essential 
dialogic principle usually associated with prose fiction” (6). Potter writes, [Clarel] may rightfully be 
considered an example of what Mikhail Bakhtin calls a novelized poem’” because it possesses two of 
the three characteristics Bakhtin identified that distinguish the novel from other genres” (213). 
 
 
25 The titles of works like Yothers’ Sacred Uncertainty, Potter’s Intersympathy of Creeds, and Goldman’s 
Protest Theism capture the biographical arguments of these critics.  
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philosophical position, the dialogues display the problem of coexisting truths. By focusing on the 
polyphonic poetics of Clarel, no character, including the third-person narrator, represents the 
author’s worldview. Bakhtin notes that the common error of associating characters with their 
author “does in fact correspond to a basic structural feature of [polyphonic] works…. [they] 
create not voiceless slaves… but free people, capable of standing alongside their creator, capable 
of not agreeing with him and even of rebelling against him” (Problems 6). In Clarel this 
polyphony is on full display: all voices are open-texts. Thus the reader, not the poem, decides 
which characters are closer to truth. 
 
 
Frustrating Form and Its Intent 
 Clarel is a frustrating poem to read not only for its thematic inconclusiveness but for its 
strange vocabulary, meter, and inconsistent rhyme scheme. Mathiessen, in his work American 
Renaissance, argues that “Clarel is practically unreadable because of Melville’s inexplicable 
choice of rhymed tetrameter as the medium for philosophic meditation” (401). Matthiessen is 
right to note the frustrating form, but there is no reason why this meter (iambic tetrameter) 
cannot be used to capture philosophical dialogues.26 Stein’s critique that “What we miss in 
Clarel is the jocular seriousness of Moby-Dick, where the ideas of the great thinkers were 
convenient grist for the buoyant imagination” (12), reflects a yearning for the older 
experimentalism of Melville. It is indeed shocking to find that the neurotic humor of Moby-Dick, 
with its “jocular seriousness” is almost completely replaced by somber meditations. However, 
 
26 Tennyson’s In Memoriam, one of the most serious poetic meditations on faith and doubt, is also written 
in tetrameter, though in four-line elegiac stanzas following an abba rhyme pattern.  
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these formal shifts fit the poem, as it reinforces the droning and seemingly endless and 
depressing depictions of the inability to adopt religious faith. 
 The narrator comments on the tone and structure of the poem before the pilgrimage 
begins, warning the reader about its unentertaining style. Clarel is presented as the Canterbury 
Tales without the tales: 
Not from brace Chaucer’s Tabard Inn  
They pictured wend; scarce shall they win  
Fair Kent, and Canterbury ken;  
Nor Franklin, squire, nor Morris-dance  
Of wit and story good as then:  
Another age, and other man,  
And life an unfulfilled romance. (II.i.7-13)  
Instead of stories blending bawdiness, heroism, piety, and romance, there are heady theological 
and philosophical discussions. The pessimism of their pilgrimage, its deaths and confounding 
theological disappointments, are not simply due to the people involved, but also the time in 
which Melville is capturing. The travelers of Clarel’s pilgrimage polyphonically, that is to say, 
holding theologically different ideas presented as equally true, represent a spectrum of 
disillusionment towards religious plurality in the nineteenth-century.  
 This polyphonic tension enters Clarel in the first canto. Clarel, an American theology 
student, is sitting alone in his room in Jerusalem, brooding over his disappointment while visiting 
the Holy Land  
  “Other cheer  
Than that anticipated here,  
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By me the learner, now I find.  
Theology, art thou so blind?” (I.i.19-16)  
Then he remembers something an American staying in Jerusalem told him: 
‘“Our New World’s worldly wit so shrewd  
Lacks the Semitic reverent mood,  
Unwordly—hardly may confer  
Fitness for just interpreter  
Of Palestine. … 
To avoid the deep saves not from storm.’” (I.i.92-96, 99)  
Although this unnamed traveler gives Clarel an answer to his disappointment, that the “New 
World” lacks Judaism’s reverence for the divine, Clarel cannot will himself into belief, “No clear 
authenticated Lore / I deemed… Tis the uprooting of content!” (I.i.101-102, 105). In this first 
canto Melville previews the form of the whole poem. Characters, not just Clarel, are 
discontented, then come across others with different points of view that produce further 
confusion. Unlike Ishmael, who through dialogic interaction tolerates new truths and is willing to 




Contrasting Loomings: Ishmael and Clarel 
 Given their similarities, it’s odd that none of the major book length studies of Clarel 
connect Clarel’s journey with Ishmael’s. Their respective journeys are parallel yet reach opposite 
conclusions. Like Ishmael, Clarel begins the poem as a wanderer. He is “looming,” as the first 
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chapter of Moby-Dick begins. Clarel is similarly bumbling around, melancholy and brooding. 
While Ishmael assuages his melancholy by going to sea because he feels almost supernaturally 
called to do so, Clarel begins to explore his surroundings because he lacks any supernatural 
sensations and hears “no sound / Except low hum” (I.i.144-145) of Jerusalem’s streets. Clarel’s 
journey begins, and remains, a fish-out-of-water story; not only is he different from the majority 
of the population of the Holy Land, but he is also out of place among the older travelers. 
Ishmael’s bildungsroman, wherein he comes to accept the cultural differences of others through 
dialogic interaction, opposes Clarel’s beginning. It is not comic, and unlike Ishmael, Clarel can 
never fully embrace new ideas. It is as if the journey of Ishmael, which becomes a celebration of 
dialogic interactions, becomes, as Clarel notes, a time of “‘unlearning,’” because the more he 
learns, the more “‘Opes the expanse of time’s vast sea’” (I.i.80-81). He accepts that bookish 
knowledge does not correlate to experiential knowledge: “‘Yes, I am young, but Asia old. / The 
books, the books not all have told.’” (I.i.82-83). Ishmael’s erudition, despite his lack of a college 
career, allow him to will pragmatic truths despite certain knowledge. But Clarel, a theology 
student drenched in study, must unlearn all he’s come to know from books, and relinquish 
rationality in the hope of finding spiritual fulfillment through direct experience of divinity.  
 Whereas Ishmael finds new beliefs through different dialogical interactions and then 
becomes a passive narrator, Clarel speaks little throughout the poem, only speaking passionately 
at the end. The lack of speech indicates Clarel’s desire to passively absorb other ideas, rather 
than dialectically struggle for higher truth. Like a Socratic interlocutor, he often interjects, asking 
questions or expressing confusion while others argue.  
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 Even when Clarel wants to speak, he cannot muster words. When Celio, a hunchbacked 
Italian full of doubt and despair, that Melville compares to the notably pessimistic nineteenth-
century Italian poet Giacomo Leopardi (I.xiv.3), meets Clarel, the narrator asks,  
 
But what’s evoked in Clarel’s mien—   
What look, responsive look is seen  
In Celio, as together there  
They pause? Can these a climax share?   
Mutual in approach may glide   
Minds which from poles adverse have come,   
Belief or unbelief? (I.xvi.50-56)  
The narrator, who notes that Celio and Clarel made long-distance eye contact before, suggests 
that some sort of bond without words exists between them. The narrator’s question, “Can these a 
climax share?” indicates both a desire for a sexual encounter,27 but also a climax of spiritual 
revelation to assuage their respective doubts. Clarel’s uncertainty of Christianity prevents 
spiritual respite. Celio’s atheistic declaration that religions are “illusive schemes,” (I.xiii.96) a 
favorite metaphor of Leopardi, battles a simultaneous pull towards spirituality; Celio muses to 
himself that “by these [Christian] monuments I’m schooled, / Arrested, strangely overruled” 
(I.xiii.136-137). Despite the meeting between them, they do not engage in conversation. Celio, 
who “turned away” (I.xvi.78) provokes the narrator’s lamentation over Clarel’s demure 
personality: “Ah, student, ill thy sort have sped: / The instant proffer—it is fled!” (I.xvi.79-80). 
 
27 While scholars acknowledge homoerotic elements in Clarel, I’ve yet to come across a book-length 
study, or Clarel-exclusive article, with a queer-centric reading. However, the sorrow brought by 
unfulfilled homoerotic bonds inverts the celebration on display in Moby-Dick, and demonstrates one of 
the pessimistic outcomes of uncertainty.  
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Unlike Ishmael’s encounter with Queequeg resulting in a loving friendship despite their 
differences, Clarel cannot muster the courage, either out of shyness or anxiety, to engage with 
Celio. That the narrator calls their potential meeting a “proffer” suggests that Clarel wants to 
offer a proposal of some kind, whether for friendship or erotic attachment, like Ishmael and 
Queequeg, is vague. It certainly suggests, however, that Clarel desires engagement in theological 
speculation with a kindred spirit. 
 Later dialogues do not lead to spiritual certainty, only further confusion or agony. 
Ironically, Clarel is saved, in a sense, from the despair of dialogue with Celio because Celio dies 
before they can converse. The narrator says when Celio dies,  
But have hearts forgot   
That ties may form where words be not?  
The spiritual sympathy  
Transcends the social. (I.xix.1-4)  
Their unspoken relationship is pure, untainted by metaphysical concerns or doubts, but when 
Clarel discovers Celio’s journal, he finds in the pages a “heart to brave / All questions on that 
primal ground / Laid bare by faith’s receding wave” (I.xix.28-30). After reading Celio’s desire 
for truth despite the pull between atheism and theism, Clarel begins to anxiously turn over many 
unanswerable questions:  
“Is death the book’s fly-page? 
Is no hereafter? If there be, 
Death foots what record? How forestalls  
Acquittance in eternity? 
Advance too, and through age on age?” (I.xix.36-40)  
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Interaction with others, in this case a dialogue with the dead, only creates more vexing questions 
for Clarel. Melville inserts this episode of Celio, which carries little bearing on the poem as a 
whole, to demonstrate Clarel’s failure to understand that the questions he asks possess no 
answer. Clarel cannot emulate this model of Ishmael’s digressions, where the lack of knowledge, 
literary authorities, and pragmatic will-to-believe become the method for truth. The optimistic 
pluralism Ishmael celebrates is unsatisfactory because, contrary to James’ pragmatic theory of 




 In stark contrast to Ishmael’s ability to adopt a truth, no matter how absurd, intellectual 
dialogues in Clarel end in confusion or agony. More precisely, Clarel is a collection of aporetic 
dialogues. Melville’s appreciation for Plato is well documented,28 and Clarel, like Plato’s 
aporetic, or inconclusive, dialogues, leave the primary question at hand unanswered; the reader 
must work through the reasons presented for the existence an abstract idea, such as beauty or 
justice, and determine which character in the dialogue is closest to the truth. In Clarel, the 
ultimate question, “can religion survive in the face of scientific advances and theological 
scrutiny?” is unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable.29 Nonetheless, the reader sees that, 
 
28 Melville first read Plato before writing Mardi. Sealts reports that “[Thomas] Browne led him in turn to 
the dialogues of Plato, which became a major influence on the form and content of [Mardi]” (39). 
Melville continued reading Plato up until his final unfinished work Billy Budd (138). For more on the 
formal and philosophical relationships between Plato and Melville, consult Michael Levin’s article “Ahab 
as Socratic Philosopher” and Sealts’ article “Melville and the Platonic Tradition” (see works cited).  
 
 
29 George Rudebusch defines aporetic dialogue as one that “begins with a question and then work[s] step 
by step to an answer. But then that answer is undermined and rejected” (Rudebusch 540-41). Scholars 
differ on whether or not the inconclusiveness is an ironic trait, or a genuine reflection of the impossibility 
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although definite truth is not reached, certain characters come closer to the truth than others. Like 
Socrates’ famous statement that his wisdom is found in knowing nothing, the characters in 
Clarel most ready to admit their lack of knowledge are more reasonable than those who ardently 
but irrationally defend their beliefs. In the end only one character, Clarel, is able to fully 
acknowledge the scope of their unknowing.  
 The agnostic poetics of Clarel create an atmosphere restlessness. Every dialogue in the 
poem designed to enlighten both the characters listening and the reader produce 
unenlightenment, confusion, or despair. For instance, when Rolfe, “an unreserved man… who 
possesses a sensitive heart and mind” (Hutchins 13) is introduced, he is contemplating Omar, a 
Muslim who refused to disturb a Christian church but rather prayed outside in solitude.30 In the 
place where Omar prayed, a minaret was erected. Rolfe uses this minaret’s symbolism to 
criticize Christianity’s violence against Omar (and Muslims in general), “‘how ill conformed / 
The butchery then to Omar’s prayer / And Heart magnanimous’” (I.xxxi.103-105). Amazed by 
his erudition, Clarel begs him to go on, and Rolfe criticizes the Catholic Church and its tradition 
of violence, starting with “‘Constantine—there falls the blight!’” (I.xxxi.115) to how it is 
“‘Unquelled by force of battering years— / Years, years, and sieges, sword and flame; / Fallen—
rebuilt, to fall anew’” (I.xxxi.146-148). Though he begs Rolfe to continue his monologue, Clarel 
presses Rolfe “in such a tone / It showed disturbance” (I.xxxi.132-133), suggesting that Rolfe’s 
knowledge and criticism of the Church causes Clarel to worry as much as it encourages curiosity. 
Rolfe argues that the Catholic Church will always exist because of its insistence to adapt to new 
 
of knowing certain philosophical questions. Similar to Melville, Rudebusch notes that inconclusiveness 
creates controversy: “There has been a persistent controversy over whether the aporetic dialogues are 
meant to convey any underlying philosophical position at all” (539).  
30 Although Rolfe is often considered the “hero” of the poem, given his humanism and earnest desire for 
religious knowledge mixed with skepticism, a later section of this chapter demonstrates this designation, 
while tempting, is textually suspect. 
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philosophies and surroundings by force. Clarel questions the plausibility of the eternal existence 
of the church (I.xxxi.185) but Rolfe responds that  
 
“Yea, long as children feel affright  
In darkness, men shall fear a God;  
And long as daisies yield delight  
Shall see His footprints in the sod.  
Is’t ignorance? This ignorant state  
Science doth but elucidate—  
Deepen, enlarge. But though ‘twere made   
Demonstrable that God is not—   
What then? It would not change this lot;   
The ghost would haunt, nor could be laid.” (I.xxxi.191-200)  
Rolfe’s initial criticism of Catholicism turns into a meditation on the necessity of religion no 
matter how advanced science becomes. The narrator notes that “Clarel ill-relished” (I.xxxi.210) 
Rolfe’s speech but also notes that, like a processional of desert travelers covered in dust, “the 
novice [Clarel] streamed along / Rolfe’s filing thoughts, a soldering throng” (I.xxxi.284-285). 
Clarel responds with confusion, as he, a “novice,” cannot grasp Rolfe’s non-dogmatic religious 
sentiments. As one scholar notes, Clarel tends to desire an either/or response to his questions,31 
but more often than not, especially when interacting with Rolfe or Derwent, a naive but 
 
31 Using the Bible as a precedent for his reading, Goldman suggests that Clarel attempts to move beyond 
“‘either/or’ absolutism characteristic of the Law and the Prophets into the more flexible ‘both/and’ of the 
Proverbs” (99). For more on the idea that Melville is emulating the Bible’s ethos towards desiring 
answers from God that are not fixed, see Goldman’s Protest Theism, especially chapter three, “God-
Wrestling: The Thematics and Poetics of ‘Contraries’” pages 73-102. 
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optimistic Anglican priest, the answers Clarel seeks are discussed through meanderings that 
avoid the question asked. Clarel wants to know how the Catholic Church will last forever, but 
Rolfe’s oblique response about the endurance of all religions doesn’t answer Clarel’s question. 
 Like the aforementioned digression about Celio, the canto “Prelusive,” which occurs 
midway through the poem (book II, Canto xxxv) as the pilgrims come across the supposed site of 
Sodom, uses a digression to warn readers about the difficulty of the poem itself. The narrator 
begins:  
In Piranezi’s rarer prints,  
Interiors measurelessly strange,  
Where the distrustful thought may range  
Misgiving still—what means the hints? (II.xxxv.1-4) 
Immediately the reader is assaulted with vague allusions to an artist. The prints in question, by 
the eighteenth-century Italian artist Piranezi, represent fantastical prisons with labyrinthine stairs 
and unsettling, dream-like architecture. These enigmatic questions are followed by the narrator’s 
usual rhetorical questioning, here asking “what means the hints?” challenging the reader to 
wonder why these dream-prisons provoke unease in the viewer. As usual, too, the narrator does 
not answer the question, but delves deeper into investigation. 
 The canto, like one of Ishmael’s essays, begins with an object, brings forth a question, 
and investigates the matter. Like Ishmael, the narrator will reach a conclusion, but the conclusion 
neither answers the question nor encourages the reader’s beliefs. The investigation proceeds with 
a brief description of these fantasy prisons, before entering into a strange, almost stream-of-
consciousness digression. From these dream-like etchings the narrator suggests that  
Thy wings, Imagination, span  
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Ideal truth in fable’s seat:  
The thing implied is one with men,  
His penetralia of retreat—  
The heart, with labyrinths replete:  
In freaks of imitation see  
Paul’s “mystery of iniquity:”  
Involved indeed, a blur of dream… (II.xxxv.18-25)  
Given the combination of difficult syntax due to the requirements of the tetrameter and the 
antiquated vocabulary, one gleans, at most, an impressionistic description of the unconscious; 
humans form “ideal truth” from “fable’s seat” by spreading the wings of our “imagination.” Like 
the labyrinthine prints of surreal prisons, our hearts are “replete” with labyrinths that prevent us 
from grasping a comfortable truth from the “penetralia,” the innermost part, of our being. It is 
only in “freaks of imitation” or some sort of spiritual experience that is more horrible than 
benign,32 that we can understand the “mystery of iniquity,” a quotation of Paul’s description of 
evil from 2 Thessalonians 2:7. The narrator then tells the reader to “Dwell on those etchings in 
the night” (II.xxxv.33) and then wait until “ye feel / The Pauline text in gray of light; / Turn 
hither then and read aright” (II.xxxv.35-37). The poetic qualities, though organized by tetrameter 
lines, cause unease in their inconsistent rhymes and bizarre imagery. 
 The end of the canto explains itself against the charge of mere digression. The narrator 
explains that the canto is named “Prelusive” because it warns the reader against reading the 
following canto:  
 
32 A similar sentiment is found preceding Ishmael’s spiritual vision of angels squeezing spermaceti. The 
young black boy Pip experiences a vision of “the multitudinous, God-omnipresent, coral insects” which 
leads to his madness. Ishmael warns that “Wisdom” defined by Judeo-Christian tradition, is “man’s 
insanity” and “heaven’s sense” (308). Whereas his own wisdom, found in mundane activities, is safer. 
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For ye who green or gray retain  
Childhood’s illusion, or but feign;  
 
As bride and suite let pass a bier—  
So pass the coming canto here. (II.xxxv.38-41) 
In other words, if the reader holds to childlike faith, or doesn’t wrack their brains around heady 
theological issues, skip the next canto and avoid existential pain. Ishmael’s advocation of 
multiple sources of knowledge is inverted: the more one knows, the more truths clash; deep 
investigations are a dangerous enterprise. Telling the reader to stop reading the poem strikes a 
modern audience as either post-modern or ironic. However, there is an earnestness in the poet to 
give readers a forewarning that Clarel’s purpose is neither to encourage nor assuage doubt. Like 
the description of the pilgrims profoundly serious, not like Chaucer’s pilgrims who pass the time 
through charming stories, the poem charitably reminds the reader that it captures the experience 
of religious uncertainty, not providing a remedy.  
 The canto “Prelusive” deals with doubt abstractly, but the following canto it warns 
against reading turns those anxieties into concrete poetic images. The pilgrims are near the 
supposed site of Sodom, and in response Mortmain gives a speech arguing that the sins of 
Sodom were “not all carnal harlotry” (II.xxxvi.43). Mortmain, a pessimistic monomaniac, is “a 
Swedish bastard who moved to Paris and started a successful, famous Utopian community” who 
later became disenchanted “with the fools who joined,” deciding instead to adopt the role of “an 
anonymous ascetic wandering the world’s wastelands in despair” (Hutchins 16). Mortmain is 
obsessively misanthropic, never allowing optimistic notions to sway his despair or hatred. His 
speech here gives a vivid portrait of his outlook. He argues that the inhabitants of Sodom were 
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by nature evil; their only sin which provoked God’s wrath was their enjoyment of existence. He 
curses God for bothering to make humanity if they are evil by nature: “Tis thou who servedst 
Mammon’s hate / Or greed through forms which holy are” (II.xxxvi.74-75). The rest of the 
pilgrims, like the “green” readers the narrator warned in the previous canto, “all had left him, one 
by one. / Was it because he open threw / The inmost to the outward view?” (II.xxxvi.110-112). 
Mortmain’s bold criticism of God, his exposure of the absurdity of creating beings designed for 
evil intent, makes the others uncomfortable and they leave him alone to contemplate the ocean in 
solitude.  
 Mortmain presents his truth through spoken dialogue. Like Pirazeni’s aforementioned 
dream-prisons, the speech reflects the labyrinths of his heart, although instead of abstract 
imagery he uses speech. Like the prints, the words create such a sense of unease in the other 
pilgrims that they leave, both literally walking away and also intellectually avoiding 
uncomfortable ideas. The poem implicitly asks: if what Mortmain says frightens people into 
leaving, and Melville includes a warning against reading it, is Mortmain the most “correct” of all 
the characters? Reading with polyphonic poetics in mind, we can safely answer no. Mortmain 
isn’t more correct than anyone else. Rather, the poem suggests that instead of dialogue, which 
leads to confusion and agony, perhaps turning away from other’s uncomfortable truths, which 




 The pilgrims of Clarel either continue to hold onto their beliefs without reason, or the 
foundations of their beliefs are lost, resulting in despair. This is explored in depth when 
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analyzing the issue of heroes in the poem later. Before that, however, it’s worth analyzing how 
the poem teases out the possibility of revelation while at the same time warning the reader, as in 
the previous section, that a revelation is not coming. Analyzing the canto “The Prodigal” 
demonstrates that so long as there is desire for spiritual certainty, certainty will not arrive.  
 Although “The Prodigal” is the only dialogue that ends complacency, it is immediately 
undone through the following cantos. The dialogue consists of Clarel and a young Lyonese 
“Prodigal” who are sharing a room for the night before heading back to Jerusalem. Their 
dialogue moves from Clarel’s praise of the Prodigal’s singing to a discussion of bodily pleasure. 
The Prodigal’s musings on a homoerotic encounter with “A young Peruvian” (IV.xxvi.51) and 
his conviction to “weigh not things too curious” (IV.xxvi.63) causes Clarel to wonder “Am I too 
curious in my mind; / And, baffled in the vain employ, / Forgoing many an easy joy?” 
(IV.xxvi.69-71). The Prodigal goes on to reinterpret Hebrew Scriptures literally, viewing the 
Song of Solomon as a praise of erotic love that justifies sexuality within religious belief. This 
unorthodox but literal reading causes Clarel to panic (IV.xxvi.179-190). The Prodigal then goes 
on to sexualize Jewish women, arguing that  
 “There is no tress  
Can thrall one like a Jewess’s.  
A Hebrew husband, Hebrew-wed,  
Is wondrous faithful, it is said;  
Which needs be true; for, I suppose,  
As bees are loyal to the rose,  
So men to beauty.” (IV.xxvi.216-222) 
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The Prodigal sexualizes the biblical Esther and argues that Christian monarchs enjoy sexual 
freedom (IV.xxvi.225-231). The narrator interjects: “Clarel looked down: was he depressed?” 
(IV.xxvi.234). The Prodigal goes on praising hedonism over the spiritual musings. Then Clarel 
looks at the Prodigal and  
He marked the clustering hair  
Which on the bright and shapely brow  
At middle part grew scantly low:  
Ruch, tumbled, chestnut hood of curls, 
Like to a Polynesian girl’s,  
Who, inland eloping with her lover… (IV.xxvi.252-257)  
Kevorkian suggests that the Prodigal proves that “Clarel needs to get out of his head, the realm 
of irresolvable concepts, and find, in poetry and through poetry, embodiment” (38), this is true. 
Indeed, more than any other passage, the length and form of this canto exposes Clarel’s biggest 
flaw: his over-thinking; reiterating that Clarel must “unlearn.” But the following two cantos 
undue this canto’s conclusiveness. After their discussion, Clarel dreams that he is standing 
“Betwixt a Shushan and a sand; / The Lyonese [the Prodigal] was lord of one” and he feels the 
Prodigal’s “Clasping arms which would detain / His heart from each ascetic range” 
(IV.xxvi.311-312, 316-317). When Clarel awakes, the Prodigal is gone, singing a song while 
wandering away. Abandoning Clarel, yet another homoerotic encounter goes unfulfilled.  
 Although the potential homoerotic encounter is gone, the Prodigal’s advice, to enjoy 
pleasure and avoid intellectual musings, lingers. The following canto, “By Parapet,” features 
Derwent monologuing about the beauty of the Prodigal, describing him as “feminine” 
(IV.xxvii.6) before sensually musing that when talking to the Prodigal,  
   
61 
“My thoughts were wandering away,  
Though never once mine eyes did stray,  
He did so pleasingly beguile  
To keep them fixed upon his form:  
Such harmony pervades his warm  
Soft outline.” (IV.xxvii.14-19) 
This praise of the Prodigal’s beauty culminates in a comparison of the Prodigal to the Greek god 
Bacchus: “the sweet shape! / Young Bacchus, mind ye, not the old:” (IV.xxvii.24-25). Derwent’s 
sudden praise of a boy’s beauty, and his comparison of his desire for the youth to the seduction 
of Erigone by Bacchus, a story wherein in Bacchus becomes a grape and impregnates Erigone 
without her knowing it, causes Clarel to wonder, “This man [Derwent]— / May Christian true 
such temper wish? / His happiness seems paganish” (IV.xxvii.34-36). That the pleasures of the 
flesh turn even the priestly Derwent to lustful thoughts and pagan morality frightens Clarel. The 
disconnect between human desire and rational belief causes him to quickly renounce the 
hedonistic lifestyle endorsed by the Prodigal. Derwent’s inconsistency teaches Clarel that no 
religious view can coexist with individual drives, be those sexual or moral. Eventually a creed or 
belief, such as Derwent’s Anglicanism, becomes inauthentic due to skepticism or non-biblical 
sexual desires outside of one’s control. Against the Prodigal’s advice, Clarel understands he 
cannot simply stop wondering about spiritual issues without relinquishing a natural drive within 
himself: the desire for spiritual satisfaction and knowledge. The following canto further 
reinforces this inauthenticity by twisting the entire context of the Prodigal’s character.  
 In the next canto, “David’s Well,” Clarel learns from a Russian who travelled with the 
Prodigal that the Prodigal lied to Clarel about his origin. The Russian reveals, “Evade he cannot, 
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no, nor hide. / Learn, he who whiled the hour for you, / His race supplied the theme: a Jew!” 
(IV.xxviii.126-128). Instead of the care-free youth Clarel supposed he was, the Prodigal is 
actually a runaway, torn between the tension of being both “melt in, [and] not be separate” 
(IV.xxviii.148) from his Jewish upbringing. To avoid the problem altogether, he runs away, 
embracing a hedonistic lifestyle. Clarel reflects, “The Lyonese, to sense so dear, / Nor less from 
faith a fugitive—” (IV.xxix.85-86). For the first time in the poem, Clarel gets angry: “the student 
felt the reign / Of reveries vague, which yet could mar, / Crossed by a surging element 
(IV.xxviii.156-159). Realizing that people like Derwent and the Prodigal adopt contradictory 
truths to avoid adherence to one creed, Clarel discovers there’s no comforting religious belief 
that also gives biological drives and emotions liberty. Forcing new beliefs against religious 
anxiety is a coping mechanism, not a beneficial truth. The Prodigal, teasing out a revelation, is 
then revealed to not provide answers that the poem seeks, but further complicate them. 
 
 
Heroes, or Lack Thereof 
 One of the most discussed issues of Clarel is the apparent lack of heroes despite its length 
and scope. The hunt for heroes in Clarel is vain. The poem undermines the notion of any 
individual attaining a truth worth sharing. Monomaniacal pilgrims, though most firm in their 
beliefs, die by mysterious suicides; Nehemiah, a fundamentalist Christian, dies during a mystical 
vision during his sleep that leads him to drown in the sea. Mortmain apparently kills himself 
through starvation because “his brain a tocsin-bell / Overburdensome for citadel / Whose base 
was shattered” (III.32.40-2) caused him to go insane. Yet even the most “healthy-minded” 
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religious characters are examples of how no worldview, helpful to oneself or others, gives true 
existential comfort so long as a lingering surety of reasons exist for their beliefs. 
 We’ve analyzed how the Prodigal, far from a hero, is another example of inauthentic 
belief. Kevorkian writes, “The form of Clarel’s awakening [after the Prodigal leaves him] recalls, 
in its actions and punctuated cadences, messianic words of healing: ‘Rise, take up thy bed, and 
walk’ (John 5:8 KJV)” (43). Aside from ignoring the two cantos which bring Clarel to 
disillusionment with both Derwent and the Prodigal, Kevorkian also looks beyond the text by 
arguing that “the Prodigal initiates in the young pilgrim an awakening that will serve him well as 
he ages” (35). But knowing that Clarel’s journey ends in complete despair, this interpretation, 
that a hypothetical older Clarel will embrace hedonism, isn’t textually grounded. It’s more 
helpful to think of the interaction with the Prodigal as another dialogic confrontation which 
undermines spiritual presuppositions, only to later bring disappointment to the undermining 
beliefs themselves. 
 Rolfe is most often designated the hero of Clarel. However, Rolfe’s ending reveals that 
although his beliefs are admirable, the reasoning behind those admirable beliefs is blinded by 
idealism and certainty. Knapp writes that Melville expresses “his own thoughts…in Rolfe” (89), 
and similarly Bezanson notes, “The general contours of Rolfe’s appearance, manner, speech, and 
mind, bear surprising resemblance to the outward image of Melville that letters and biographical 
data of the period 1845-1851 suggest” (“Introduction” lxxxv). Potter, a proponent of the Rolfe-
Melville theory, summarizes this theory of connecting Rolfe to Melville: “Rolfe, the true hero of 
the poem, confesses his doubt even as he openly reverses the religion, laments its loss, and 
relentlessly pursues answers” (206). If Rolfe is the hero, then a democratic optimism infused 
with philosophical skepticism would reign triumphant as the ideal worldview. While Rolfe is 
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certainly one of the more charitable figures in the poem given his nuanced respect towards 
theism and atheism, his humanism leads to un unwinding of his beliefs.33 
 In the final book of the poem, Rolfe loses the foundation of his ecumenical humanism. 
Rolfe suggests to the pilgrims that communist class conflict can be avoided by a “firm founding 
of the state” (IV.xxi.100), that is, a solid democratic system. This hope for non-violent social 
change prompts the pessimistic Ungar to respond.34 Ungar, a Confederate civil-war veteran, 
disillusioned with America, now abhors slavery, democracy, modern industrialization, and while 
a Christian, argues that “Churches as worldly as the state” dominate culture (IV.10.166). Instead, 
he yearns, paradoxically, for either a return to the feudalism of the middle ages, or a communist 
revolution. In response to Rolfe’s democratic idealism, Ungar argues democratic governments, 
valuing enlightenment-era ideals, create “Man disennobled—brutalized / By popular science—
Atheized / Into a smatterer—” (IV.xxi.139-141). Overwhelmed by the persuasiveness of Ungar’s 
arguments, Rolfe, usually calm and collected, uncharacteristically bursts into despair, crying, 
“Oh, oh!” (IV.xxi.142). Against Rolfe’s cries, Ungar finishes his speech on the wickedness of 
modern society, specifically its industrial advances and racism, saying “May on your vast plains 
shame the race / In the dark Ages of Democracy” (IV.xxi.147-148), calling out the hypocrisy of 
the “firm states” which Rolfe hopes for. For the rest of the poem, Rolfe refuses to engage in 
discussions, realizing he’s lost his idealism because its source came from a faith in democracy to 
unify humanity, despite its multitudinous nature, without violence. Two cantos after Ungar’s 
 
33 I’m not concerned with whether or not Rolfe resembles Melville in manners or beliefs. I mention these 
readings to point out that the character scholars most attach to Melville is almost universally declared the 
hero of the poem. 
 
 
34 Although this critical canto is discussed by Potter and Knapp, neither discuss Rolfe’s role in the 
dialogue. No reading of the poem I’ve found mentions Rolfe’s response, or the affect on his character, 
presented in this canto.  
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speech, “Twilight,” Rolfe makes his final speaking appearance. However, instead of engaging 
with Derwent in dialogue, Rolfe’s responses, usually loquacious, are no longer than three words. 
Derwent discusses his disdain for Ungar’s pessimism, to which Rolfe, indicating Ungar, replies 
curtly, “‘He’s wise’” (IV.xxiv.32). When Derwent raves, contra Ungar, about the wonders of the 
natural world, such as the beauty of birds, Rolfe responds, without a trace of his characteristic 
wit or investigative interest, “‘Ay, birds’” (IV.xxiv.29). Persuaded by the overt-pessimism of 
Ungar, and accepting that an ideal democracy is an illusion, Rolfe ends the pilgrimage in quiet 
despair. 
 Derwent’s inner conflict between Anglican priesthood and homosexuality demonstrate 
the inability to reconcile multiple beliefs with one’s personal constitutions.35 While on the 
surface quite cheerful, Derwent nonetheless experiences the inability of authentically accepting 
any belief without simultaneously sacrificing his selfhood. Much like his attraction to the 
Prodigal, a contradictory combination of Grecian pederasty and the expected sexuality of an 
Anglican priest, Derwent’s continual syncretization of new ideas with old ideas creates an 
inauthentic self. 
 What becomes of Rolfe and Derwent is unknown. After returning to Jerusalem they leave 
Clarel. In response the narrator only comments, “the world is rent / With partings” (IV.xxxii.15-
 
35 Berthold, as mentioned earlier, suggests Derwent is the hero of the poem. This runs counter to scholars 
who dismiss his optimism as naive, but Berthold rightly points out that Derwent brings, soothing 
discourse” to the poem which allows readers to “perform the democratic thinking essential to adopting a 
viable moral code in uncertain times” (140). Derwent is certainly more enjoyable to read; the few 
instances of humor in the poem often spring from his wit.Yet Derwent himself, though unaware of it, 
demonstrates that his syncretization of new sciences, theologies, and philosophies, make him a believer of 
so many truths so as to really possess none. Additionally, in response to criticism, Derwent is dismissive. 
Rolfe criticizes his optimism by arguing that religions and civilizations are getting worse while 
industrialization advances technology, The rank world prospers; but alack! / Eden nor Athens shall come 
back” (II.viii.35-36). Rolfe s ideas trouble Derwent but he dismisses Rolfe, Pathetic grows thou,
Derwent said: / And lightly, as in leafy glade, / Lightly he in the saddle sat” (II.viii.42-44). 
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16). Beyond the text of the poem, one cannot say whether Derwent will recognize his 
contradictory beliefs or Rolfe will regain his idealism. Like Clarel, who disappears into an alley, 
the future of these characters is not hinted by the poem. The fate of these characters is left to the 
reader. 
 Clarel reaches no conclusions. No holy pilgrimage or dialogical investigation provides 
truth. A reader might wonder if Clarel is a meaningless poem. Quite the opposite. Thematically, 
the inconclusiveness is not a call to “read between the lines” and find hope amidst despair, but 
instead, like Plato’s aporetic dialogues, push the reader to confront their own beliefs. If any 
wisdom is found in Clarel, it is a negative wisdom like Ecclesiastes. Kohelet’s saying “For in 
much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow” (Eccl. 1:18 
KJV) is mopped into: much knowledge lessens the capacity for belief. Any foundational force of 
belief can and will eventually collapse in the face of someone else’s contradictory belief or the 
advance of rational science. Instead of enlightening, dialogue serves as a reminder of how much 
an individual does not know. The only character to recognize this is Clarel, whose tragic end, 
while remaining tragic, nonetheless achieves his goal of “unlearning” by finally relinquishing 
any foundations of certainty. 
 
 
Clarel’s End and Clarel’s End 
 Clarel’s journey causes the loss of religious beliefs possessed at the beginning of the 
poem. When he learns of Ruth’s death, Clarel bursts out in despair, railing against the Jewish 
religion and its laws, “And ye—your tribe—’twas ye denied / Me access to this virgin’s side / In 
bitter trial: take my curse!” (IV.xxx.97-99). Clarel, like a passive Ahab, cries, “O blind, blind, 
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barren universe! / Now I am like a bough torn down, / And I must wither, cloud or sun!” 
(IV.xxx.100-102) ultimately concluding that his “Conviction is not gone / Though faith’s gone” 
(IV.xxx.126-127). The word “Conviction” here is intentionally vague. It could refer to his lost 
Christian faith, or it could refer to an ethical conviction that, despite the loss of Christian faith, 
the ethical principles of that religion persist. However, this conviction, in the context of the poem 
as a whole, is likely the broader conviction that some ultimate truth exists beyond human 
comprehension. Without the ability to will himself into a faith that describes this truth, Clarel 
proceeds to indifferently walk away from the crowds of suffering travelers along the Via Crucis. 
Unlike Ahab’s active vengeance against the inscrutable pasteboard mask, Clarel’s rebellion 
ignores the divine.  
 The penultimate canto “Via Crucis” is a carnivalesque vision in a humorless mode. 
Instead of using the space to express cultural difference or reverse hierarchies, the carnival of the 
Via Crucis follows  
…the way  
Tradition claims to be the one  
Trod on that Friday far away  
By Him [Jesus]. (IV.xxxiv.18-20) 
Pilgrims of various backgrounds, Buddhists, Jews, Muslim women, and Christians, all walk in 
silence,“ Cross-bearers all, alike they tend / And follow, slowly follow on” (IV.xxxiv.43-44). 
Clarel, watching, feels the burden of the ten-day pilgrimage, but decides not to follow the 
pilgrims united through suffering. Instead, he comments, ‘“They wire the world—far under sea / 
They talk; but never comes to me / A message from beneath the stone” (IV.xxxiv. 51-53). Clarel 
acknowledges the ubiquity of suffering, but hears no “message” to encourage him to accept this 
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fact. Clarel then moves on: “Dusked Olivet he leaves behind, / And, taking now a slender wind, / 
Vanishes in the obscurer town” (IV.xxxiv.54-56). Clarel’s pilgrimage ends as a successful anti-
bildungsroman, wherein he “unlearns” all he thought he knew. Yothers’ reading, mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter, is confounding because the phrase “Sacred Uncertainty,” which 
sounds agnostic, is specifically not agnostic according to Yothers (214). Yothers' and Potter’s 
argument that the “intersympathy of creeds” is a “mystical experience of the reality of religious 
pluralism” (Sacred 178) is not textually grounded. Clarel notes the sufferers but then walks a 
separate path. Clarel, knowing that even Rolfe fell into despair because of his humanism, 
acknowledges the Via Crucis as a symbol for the ubiquity of suffering, but Clarel does not join 
them. Joining the sorrowful path every religion follows, would mean believing in suffering as the 
unifying solution to unbelief. The poem dismisses democracy, humanism, and universalism as 
foundational reasons for belief, and the poem ends by adding suffering to the mix. Suffering does 
not justify belief. 
 The epilogue of Clarel functions as an agnostic credo. Instead of a creed affirming belief 
or providing guidelines to faith, the epilogue asks unknowable questions and provides no 
answers. It begins with the central crisis of the poem summed up in a question: “If Luther’s day 
expand to Darwin’s year, / Shall that exclude the hope—foreclose the fear?” (IV.xxxv.1-2). This 
strangely worded question asks if religion and science will join forces to bring certainty and 
peace or only further confound. Instead of answering, the narrator muses that despite “all the 
claims our times avow” (IV.xxxv.3) still “comes Despair, whom not her calm may cow, / And 
coldly on that adamantine brow / Scrawls undeterred his bitter pasquinade” (IV.xxxv.5-7). 
Although there are scientific advances, despair endures and performs a “bitter pasquinade,” or a 
public lampooning of the sciences which humans hold dear. Despite despair, however,  
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Faith (who from the scrawl indigent turns)  
With blood warm oozing from her wounded trust, 
Inscribes even on her shards of broken urns  
The sign o ’the cross. (IV.xxxv.8-11) 
Faith, even if it is bloody and broken, persists in modern society. The narrator asks “dumb 
Nature” (IV.xxxv.22) why the increase of knowledge only furthers despair and weakens faith. 
Again, there is no answer. The narrator argues that since there is no path to truth, those people 
“Who in life’s pilgrimage have baffled striven— / Even death may prove unreal at the last, / And 
stoics be astounded into heaven” (IV.xxxv.24-26). A glimmer of hope: there may exist some 
ultimate truth. There is no certainty of this, however. The narrator argues that if we don’t know 
the truth, hope in the truth’s existence will persist. Three consequences of willing oneself into 
faith appear in the poem: it doesn’t assuage suffering, it produces monomaniacs or 
fundamentalists, and it causes an inauthentic relationship with the self. What purpose does faith 
serve? While faith persists, its benefits wane in the increasingly scientific and globalized world.  
 The final eight lines of the epilogue encourage Clarel to “keep thy heart, though yet but 
ill-resigned” (IV.xxxv.27) because “like a swimmer rising from the deep…/ Emerge 
thou mayst from the last whelming sea, / And prove that death but routs life into victory” 
(IV.xxxv.30, 33-34; emphasis mine). The ending echoes the final lines of Plato’s aporetic 
Theaetetus, where Socrates encourages his interlocutor, despite their failure to discover what 
knowledge is, that "you will be modest and not think you know what you don't know” (399). 
Humility is a result of their failure (and probable continual failures) to reach true notions of 
ideals. Adopting truths without sufficient cause hinders humility, and only Clarel leaves the 
poem aware of the necessity of a truly agnostic methodology in order to begin living a humble, 
   
70 
existentially authentic, and ethical life. The poem demonstrates that ignorance is indeed bliss and 
blind faith gives life purpose, but the costs of ignorance and unreasoned faith are reiterated over 
and over: monomania, inauthentic selfhood, and despair. Although Clarel’s end is still tragic, 
losing the capacity for the Christian belief he sought to revive, he nonetheless avoids the larger 
tragedy of unreasonable belief that could collapse at any moment as science and political thought 
continues to shift and undermine spirituality. 
 Moby-Dick captures the cheer of turning away from orthodoxy: homoerotic bonds, 
laughter, and pragmatic truths collide to demonstrate the joy of life without dogmatic certainty. 
Clarel, however, shows that these hopes are fantasies. The cheerfulness Ishmael finds could only 
exist on an isolated boat away from society. Clarel’s journey through the Holy Land displays, 
rather than teaches, that freedom from orthodoxy does not necessarily bring comfort. 
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